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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME)
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array
of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part
of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by
world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and
books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to
meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world.
Col. John D. Waghelstein (Ret.) is the author of this case study,
which examines ways of recognizing an insurgency while it is still in its
early stages. This case looks at the strategic and operational effects of
interagency friction, intelligence assessments, and how to recognize the
nature of the conflict. It includes a framework for analyzing insurgencies
at their earliest stages; it also provides a set of benchmarks that have
helped operators to better understand their environment. The framework is
not meant to be conclusive; rather, it is a set of questions to help current
operators consider when and whether an organized rebellion is forming.
The case also raises the issue of what other indicators we should be aware
of in a 21st century, social media world.
It is also important to note four critical caveats to this case study.
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval
War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible
for the content of this case study. Third, this is a methodology for
3
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recognizing an insurgency and is just one approach. There are others and it
is up to the student—the practitioners and operators—to adapt this
framework and others to suit their environment and conditions. And
fourth, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are
written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics including
strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral
questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make
these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills
the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11
world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in highpressure situations.
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students
conducting research on Honduras and Latin America will probably find
the extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the
case study author and by CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College,
the bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of
related topics. We hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing
your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to
the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the
Naval War College.
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Acronyms and Terms
AOH: Honduran Army
CBI: Caribbean Basin Initiative
CONUS: Contiguous United States
CREM: Regional Training Center (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento
Militar)
DR: Dominican Republic
ESAF: Armed Forces of El Salvador (Fuerza Armada de El Salvador)
ESF: Economic Support Funds
FAST: Forward Area Support Team
FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo
Martí de Liberación Nacional)
FOB: Forward Operating Base
FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberación Nacional)
GOH: Government of Honduras
Good Neighbor Policy: The Good Neighbor Policy was first introduced by
President Franklin Roosevelt and dealt with U.S.-Latin American
relations. The policy pledged non-interference in the domestic
affairs by the U.S. and looked to increase mutual trade
relationships.
JTF: Joint Task Force
JTF-B: Joint Task Force Bravo
Monroe Doctrine: A policy outlined in President James Monroe’s 7th
State of the Union Address in 1823. In his speech, Monroe
declared that the Americas should be free of all influence from
Europe—any further efforts on the part of Europe at colonizing the
Americas would be seen as a provocation and would see retaliation
from the United States.
MPLC: Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement, aka Cinchoneros
7

WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

MTT: Mobile Training Team
ODA: Operation Detachment Alpha
PCH: Communist Party of Honduras
PRTCH: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers of Honduras
Roosevelt Corollary: Enacted in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt,
this policy was a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine. It put forth
the idea that the United States should assume responsibility for
enforcing good behavior in South America, and thus prevent any
intrusion by outside powers.
RSOI: Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration
SAF: Special Action Force (8th Special Forces Group [Airborne], Special
Action Force, Latin America)
SCIF: Secure/Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SFG: Special Forces Group
SFGA: Special Forces Group Airborne
SFOD A/B: Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha/Bravo
SOT-A: Special Operations Team—Alpha
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
USEMB: United States Embassy
USMILGP: United States Military Group
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I. Introduction
In the early hours of July 4, 1982, buildings in the Honduran
capital of Tegucigalpa shook with a bomb blast that rattled the windows
and turned off the lights. Such acts were not uncommon over the border in
El Salvador, but were shocking in Honduras. The newly elected
government of Suazo Cordova, the first civilian leader after a decade of
military rule, had just been served notice that the civil war in El Salvador
between the ruling military government and the leftist insurgents (the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN) had spread to
Honduras. According to the communiqué the bombers issued that night,
the act had been carried out by Salvadoran guerrillas in retaliation for
Honduran army counterguerrilla operations against them in the disputed,
demilitarized, border region between the two countries. This region, the
bolsones, resulted from the so-called Soccer War of 1969 and had become
safe havens for the El Salvadoran insurgents.
The guerrillas escalated their activities in the Honduran city of San
Pedro Sula on September 17, 1982 by seizing the Chamber of Commerce
and holding 80 members hostage for eight days. Their demands included
the immediate release of a Salvadoran insurgent held by the Hondurans
and the expulsion of all foreign advisors.
The hostages were eventually released and the guerrillas’ demands
ignored. The hostage takers were flown to Cuba via Panama. Taking
hostages had been the hallmark of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in their
successful 12-year war against the Somoza regime (1967–1979), and now
Honduras was getting a taste. The ugly war in El Salvador had spilled over
to Honduras. Or had it? The questions that were raised in response to these
incidents varied widely between different officials. Was Honduras really
next, or was this merely spillover from the chaos of the region?
In 1980, a Honduran Committee for Solidarity with the Struggle
for Central American Peoples had been organized, which enlisted support
9
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for the El Salvadoran FMLN and established liaison for aid from
communist Nicaragua. The Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers of Honduras (PRTCH) and several other small revolutionary
groups joined the PCH coalition in 1982. One such group that would be
heard from was the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MPLC) or
“Cinchoneros.”
For nearly 18 months there was silence from the guerillas and then
it began. Reports of attacks on the Honduran Supreme Court building,
police stations, a military school, and the Salvadoran consulate filtered in.
What was really going on? Why weren’t these reports taken seriously and
acted upon? What were we missing? For nearly three years a budding
insurgency had been incubating in plain view, but various factors
precluded a formal recognition of it or an effective response. Lacking a
means of identifying trigger points of insurgency, the powers that be were
mostly oblivious to impending threats. The situation required a fresh and
experienced observer to assess what was happening, and a matrix by
which to evaluate those threats.

Honduras was my last insurgency.
In the preceding 26 years, I had participated in operations in
Vietnam and South East Asia, the Cuban missile crisis, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and El Salvador. Pretty much anywhere
there was an insurgency, I had seen some aspect of it.
My involvement in Honduras came with assuming command of the
7th Special Forces Group (SFG) in the spring of 1985. The group’s beat
was all of Latin America and the Caribbean. At that time, the situation in
Honduras did not look like much of an insurgency and 7th SFG’s focus
was elsewhere: El Salvador and Nicaragua. The ongoing war in El
Salvador got a sizable amount of the 7th’s attention, and all those Russianmade tanks and other stuff that had been provided to the new Marxist
10
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government in Managua, Nicaragua got the rest. Honduras was an
afterthought. The 7th SFG’s mandate did include backstopping the army
of Honduras (AOH) with training and advice and implementing war plans
should the Nicaraguans decide to invade their neighbor. But our focus was
Honduras’s neighbors, and this was essentially a conventional role, with
little concern for our rear.
My initial assessment was that an internal threat by some sort of
insurgents or at least rebels seemed to be active in Honduras. The question
was who, how, and why?
All this changed, however, over the several months I visited
Honduras in spring 1985. As I read the reports—cable traffic, mostly—I
became suspicious that something more sinister might be brewing. An
attack here, an incident there, a person targeted, and propaganda targeting
the government and later targeting us. It all seemed more than random acts
of violence; it looked organized. An old framework from my Vietnam
counterinsurgency days helped pose the right assessment questions. Some
of those questions were: Was there evidence of subversive (and/or
Communist) groups operating within the country or receiving external
assistance? Was there increasing provocation to force governmental
response? Were local officials being kidnapped or killed?
Complicating matters, my concerns were dismissed by the U.S.
Embassy, Southern Command, and the Honduran Army. At this point,
almost three years after the initial attacks, the almost universal response
was “we killed all the guerrillas in ‘82 and ’83.” The Honduran police
entity (FUSEP) was much less dismissive, but they were thin on the
ground and 7th SFG was proscribed from dealing directly with them
because of post-Vietnam legislation.
So the question became: Was there really an insurgency festering
in Honduras? If so, what evidence did we have, and how could we
persuade others to our point of view?
11
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Having (mis?)spent most of my career in the counterinsurgency
arena, I knew that the typical “gringo” way of direct confrontation was not
going to get anywhere, so I opted for a more subtle approach: I altered 7th
SFG deployments to Honduras from one massive annual surge operation
to a series of deployments involving fewer teams but having a constant
presence.
Instead of sending the Group HQ and two battalions for a few
weeks, we put four to six operational detachments alpha (ODAs) and a B
detachment on a continuous rotation. I directed these teams to report
whatever they saw, paying particular attention to what was going on in
Honduras on the ground. Their job was to read the tea leaves and figure
out whether there was any merit to our suspicions.
Over the next year, we had full-time Special Forces assets
observing and reporting while training with the AOH. Because a SF Group
had its own Intelligence unit, we were also able to report our observations
directly into the intelligence stream. You will see the reaction that
generated.
It took a while and a lot of reporting, in-fighting, and rethinking,
but eventually Southern Command changed its position and came to the
conclusion there was something occurring on the north coast of Honduras.
If it had not been for Gen. John Galvin, this might have ended differently.
Of all the Southern Command Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) I worked
for over three decades, he was the most effective. Eventually the AOH
also became believers and, with a little help from us, took the lead in
dealing with the threat. Ultimately, the guerrillas were destroyed.
This case is about an insurgency that apparently had all the
essentials for success but never transitioned beyond Phase One, the protoinsurgency phase. According to Daniel Byman,1 the success or failure of a
1 For an excellent report on how insurgencies move from ragtag bands of fighters
or terrorists to “full-blown insurgencies,” see Daniel Byman, Understanding
Proto-Insurgencies (Rand, 2007).
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proto-insurgency depends in large part on the reaction of the state. This
case examines a wide range of issues that worked against the Honduran
government’s success at extirpating the insurgency, including institutional
indifference and preoccupation with external threats on the part of the
Honduran Army, bureaucratic inertia on the part of the American incountry entities, and turf sensitivity by U.S. intelligence. In spite of these
obstacles, the Government of Honduras (GOH) eventually neutralized the
insurgent threat. The prevailing question is: How was this threat
recognized?
Case study users are encouraged to use both the Vietnam-era
checklist in Part IV and Analyzing Insurgency (Annex A) as tools for
getting at the guts of this case. Those of us who were on the ground then
did not have the benefit of much more than the checklist.

Discussion Questions
1. What role does institutional friction play in the slow acknowledgement
of the existence of an insurgency in this case?
2. What institutional adaptation does the 7th Group implement to
improve their ability to assess the situation on the ground?
3. What friction does this create with other institutions, and why?
4. How could you overcome that friction?

13
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II. Phase One and Two Insurgencies
Phase One insurgencies are usually more about propaganda or
public affairs than a serious threat to the government. Scattered acts of
terrorism may be all the insurgency is capable of conducting but, as we
know from the Middle East, they can still be effective. Sometimes there is
a series of well-publicized attacks on the infrastructure, which would
include electrical, transportation, and communications targets.
Assassinations have also served the same purpose and are particularly
effective if the target is a well-known official (e.g., Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, June 1914; President Anwar Sadat in Cairo,
October 1981). These types of attacks are relatively easy to conduct, are
cheaply resourced, serve as confidence builders, and most importantly get
the public’s attention. In El Salvador during this same period, for example,
the highly vulnerable power grid was targeted almost nightly by a much
more developed and aggressive FMLN insurgency. The first actions in
Honduras were small in scope and relatively timid.
When an insurgency has solidified a portion of the population as a
base, has well-established logistics, has developed the necessary
infrastructure, and has built enough internal confidence and uncertainty in
the targeted regime, it may be time to ratchet up the volume and go to
Phase Two. This phase can include all the activity of Phase One as well as
armed group attacks on public security forces, visible international
entities, or even well-guarded military bases. It should be noted that
determining this “inflection point” is an art and not a science.2 There have

2

This transitional stage is expounded upon in the report by Daniel Byman,
Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, op.cit. The report focuses on “measures that
indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent
movements.” Byman cites the following indicators to consider: (1) the strength of
the proffered identity; (2) group composition; (3) relations with other community
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been insurgencies that have overthrown the targeted government in short
order (two years for Cuba) and others that have not (20 years for China).
No formulas, no scripts, and no precedents exist that offer a sure-fire
roadmap to victory for either side. There had been some low-level
insurgent activity in Honduras. The question was, how serious was it?

members; (4) use of and response to violence; (5) existence of sanctuary; (6)
external support; and (7) state response (p. 51).
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III. Background
The Cold War in the 1950s witnessed Soviet support of leftist
movements in Central America, but distance and logistics made these
threats ineffective. When the leftist Jacobo Arbenz regime took power in
Guatemala (1953–1954) and began threatening U.S. economic and
political interests, for example, CIA support helped to overthrow Arbenz.3
Indeed, throughout the region, the United States supported those
threatened friendly governments with military aid. With Fidel Castro’s
1959 triumph in Cuba, however, there now existed a base for exporting
revolution into the Southern hemisphere, and Castro wasted little time in
spreading his brand of revolution (see Venezuela 1960). In response to this
new threat, President Kennedy’s policy initiatives included the Alliance
for Progress and counterinsurgency efforts to support U.S. allies besieged
by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements. The primary
counterinsurgency effort was carried out by the 7th Special Forces Group
(SFG) (1961-1962); the 8th Special Action Force (SAF) (1963–1973) and
the 7th SFG (1973–present).
From 1960 to 1979, U.S.-backed Latin American militaries put
these insurgencies out of business with painful regularity. From Argentina
to Guatemala, Castro-inspired guerrillas suffered defeat after defeat, the
most spectacular being the disastrous end to Che Guevara’s Bolivian
adventure in 1967. The Bolivian operation was in large part the result of
the training efforts of an 8th SAF Mobile Training Team (MTT) that

Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh, “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954
Documents,” George Washington University National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 4. Accessed Aug 11, 2011.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
3

16

WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

deployed from Panama.4 Moscow, having consistently advised
accommodation and long-term subversion, watched with an “I told you
so” attitude. This slower “peaceful revolution” approach seemed to have
worked in Chile with the 1970 election of Marxist Salvador Allende. This
success was short-lived, however, as the Chilean military overthrew the
regime in 1973.5 By the mid-1970s, after repeated failures, the Moscowline advocates and the pro-Havana players reached a synthesis and began a
combination of armed revolution and temporary alliances with dissatisfied
non-communist elements. This synthesis eventually achieved a near
success in El Salvador and victory in Nicaragua in 1979.6 The Soviets and
Castro had finally achieved what had eluded revolutionaries for two
decades.
Despite this apparent synthesis of Havana- and Moscow-based
insurgencies, there were fissures in the façade. “Castroites” were known
for impatience and Moscow adherents for caution, which sometimes led to
4

Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in
Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007); Stephen G. Rabe, The Most
Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1999); Michel Gobat, “Review of ‘Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance
for Progress in Latin America’,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3
(2008): 872-873; Stephen M. Streeter, “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal
Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for
Progress,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 57-68; Ernest R. May, “The
Alliance for Progress in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (1963).
5
Paul E. Sigmund “The ‘Invisible Blockade’ and the Overthrow of Allende,”
Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974).
6
For a brief synopsis of events in El Salvador and Nicaragua, see “El Salvador
Civil War,” GlobalSecuirty.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm (accessed July
12, 2011); William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, “Oligarchs and
Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (1980): 10841103; William M. LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?”
Foreign Affairs 58, no. 1 (1979): 28-50.
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rash acts or lost opportunities. Their differences sometimes were violent.
At the end of the El Salvadoran insurgency, one group recognized the
futility of continuing the struggle and pulled the rest to a negotiated end to
the war.7 Honduran leftist organizations had a similar experience but
ended without a seat at the bargaining table.
The Honduras case here may be considered the last in a series of
Soviet-backed attempts to destabilize the region.

Charles T. Call, “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the
Rule of Law in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (2003):
827-862; Tricia Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations
and the Conspiracy to End the War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998);
“War’s End in El Salvador,” The Economist, 1 February 1992.
http://www.economist.com/node/13311602.
7
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Map 1: Central America and the Caribbean
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Map 2: Honduras, Overview
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Map 3: Honduras and the Bolsones
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IV. The Checklist
The indicators in this checklist8 were designed to help clarify the
general level of insurgent activity but may only point toward cumulative
effect. Remember that the typical first phase is primarily focused on
infrastructure development and in sensitizing the population. Each act,
even the non-violent ones, are part of that theatre that educates and
informs the population and points out the government’s weaknesses.
Insurgency Checklist
1.
Have communist-trained leaders been found in the country?
2.
Is there evidence of clandestine subversive organizations in
the country?
3.
Is there evidence or indication of a subversive organization
that is receiving external assistance?
4.
Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest and
dissension among the people?
5.
Is there propaganda against actual or proposed government
programs?
6.
Are there active disinformation campaigns?
7.
Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the
government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction?
8.
Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures from the
government?
9.
Are local officials being kidnapped or killed?
10.
Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla action
on a small scale?

8

Source: Special Text ST 31-176 Counterinsurgency Planning Guide, EEI p. 53.
Pub date-1963/1964
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A. Discussion
1.
Have communist-trained leaders been found in the
country?
Creating “wiring diagrams” of insurgent organizations is
difficult and time-consuming, but vital to success. Those
organizational charts with names, biographies, contacts, and
photographs are a must in putting insurgencies out of business and
in many ways are similar to the effort needed to dismantle
organized criminal organizations such as the Mafia. There were
communists in Honduras, but due to the operation of General
Alvarez Martinez, chief of the AOH, there was little activity, and
few prominent players’ names even made the papers.
2.
Is there evidence of clandestine subversive
organizations in the country?
Getting inside these organizations is dangerous business
that requires deep-cover agents or turned members. Answering this
indicator’s question, as with the previous one, relies partly on
electronic intercepts (SIGINT) and other forms of technical
intelligence (e.g., PHOTINT)9 for information, but the critical
route is via human sources. Human intelligence (HUMINT) trumps
all. The satellite photos may tell you where the bad guys are and
SIGINT what they are saying at the moment, but they do not tell
you where they will be and what they have planned for tomorrow.
During the “quiet time,” the leftist organizations, for the most part,
were exhibiting a low profile.
3.
Is there evidence or indication of a subversive
organization that is receiving external assistance?
This type of support is the easiest to quantify. Consider
how much effort went in to interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail
9

PHOTINT: Photographic Intelligence
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during the Vietnam War.10 The unending flow of troops and
supplies kept the war in southeast Asia going and was almost
impervious to our interdiction efforts. But outside assistance isn’t
the only way to keep an insurgency going. Other means of support
come from the opposing military through capture; from the general
population, either freely given or coerced; and from manufacture
within the organization. In the early stages, an insurgency often
relies heavily on outside support. As it becomes more developed,
internal support picks up some, but not all, of the slack. For
example, when it came to the leftists’ 1984 destruction of the PanAmerican Highway Bridge over the Rio Lempa in El Salvador,
outside demolition specialists from Eastern Europe were called in
to drop the bridge.
The Sandinistas were making no secret of their support of
whatever action was being taken against the governments of El
Salvador and Honduras. Periodically there would be a successful
interception of supplies, such as the 1982 intercept of a weaponsladen truck on the El Salvador-Guatemala border. U.S. intelligence
services are particularly attuned to outside logistical movement and
its quantification. Once the existence of this support is known,
however, the real job is assessing how much are you interdicting.
“The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a network of routes by which men and munitions
were sent from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam and
eventually also to Cambodia during the Vietnam War. These routes ran through
the Truong Son Mountains, on both sides of the border between Vietnam and
southeastern Laos.” Edwin E. Moise, “Review of ‘The Road to Freedom: A
History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail’,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (2006): 558;
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175-200; Gregory T. Banner, The War
for the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Army Command and General Staff College, 1993);
John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War
(New York: Wiley, 1999).
10
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As in Vietnam, the difficulty in quantification is how much of what
are you stopping. We knew how many trucks were destroyed, but
were never certain as to many trucks were involved to begin with.
4.
Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest
and dissension among the people?
All insurgencies draw propaganda points from an existent
set of issues or grievances that concern all or parts of the
population. These issues can be exploited for their propaganda
value. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S./South Vietnamese
Strategic Hamlet program attempted to separate the guerrillas from
the population.11 It also separated the population from their
villages and from the tombs of their ancestors, however, with
serious repercussions and loss of popular support for the
government. As we shall see below, the Honduran left used the
presence of large numbers of “gringos,“ the road-building
operations, and the presence of El Salvadoran troops in the
Honduran Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional
Entranimiento Militar, or CREM) as issues.
5.
Is there propaganda against actual or proposed
government programs?
Even the best-intentioned program designed to alleviate
discontent can be used as grist for the propagandist’s mill. A twist
here, a little spin there, and the program becomes ineffective,
dangerous, or sinister. In El Salvador, the three-phase land reform
program achieved considerable success in undermining the
John C. Donnell and Gerald Cannon Hickey, The Vietnamese “Strategic
Hamlets“: A Preliminary Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962);
Peter F. Leahy, “Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail?”
(Thesis/dissertation (M.S.): National government publication, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1990); Philip E. Catton, “CounterInsurgency and Nation Building: The Strategic Hamlet Programme in South
Vietnam,“ The International History Review 21, no. 4 (1999): 918-940.
11
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FMLN’s appeal. The FMLN responded by refashioning and
focusing on the least effective segment, thereby diminishing the
whole reform program. Through the propagandist’s lens, the muchneeded farm-to-market road building became twisted into
“disruption of Honduran tranquility,” “unfairly benefitting special
interests or privileged families,” or “roads are for U.S. invasion of
Nicaragua.”
6.
Are there active disinformation campaigns?
False, partially false, or marginally false disinformation
campaigns can generate dissatisfaction with the government and,
as noted above, with government programs. Rumors seem to travel
faster than radio waves in rural Third World cultures, and once
repeated they are often held as gospel, particularly when there is no
dissenting view. The war in the arena of public opinion is as
important as combat in the jungle, if not more so.
7.
Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the
government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction?
Closely related to the previous indicator, this action takes
disinformation a step up, and we might witness a peaceful
demonstration against the government’s programs. A peaceful
demonstration can be changed to a violent one in a wink and lead
overzealous law enforcement to bloody reprisal. Each such
incident can provide the agitator with a new propaganda
opportunity.
8.
Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures
from the government?
The next step on the escalator for the insurgent is
government prohibition against all demonstrations. The real goal is
to create an environment where all means of expression are denied.
The unavailability of outlets for debate adds to the frustration of
the population, which in turns improves the movement’s recruiting
26

WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

opportunities. One of the objectives in the Venezuelan FLN
insurgency (1960–1966) was to incite the military to overthrow the
democratically elected government of Romulo Betancourt. Once
that had been achieved, the army would then be able to be more
easily dealt with. The army stayed loyal in this case, and the
guerrillas eventually were defeated.
9.
Are local officials being kidnapped or killed?
As with other acts of violence, attacks such as assassination
or kidnapping get press coverage for the insurgents. Hostage taking
requires a bit more sophistication and nerve, as the hostage and
hostage takers are in the same target area until there is a break in
the standoff. A relatively simple but effective tool, assassination
has been used for centuries. Michael Collins’s use of assassination
in Ireland (1920–1921) eventually helped bring the British Empire
to the negotiating table, and assassination eventually helped drive
the British out of Palestine (1947–1948). Assassination is theatre,
demonstrates government weakness and vulnerability, and, when
the victim is unpopular, helps the insurgent gain legitimacy. In
Vietnam, for example, the targets of VC assassination were often
tax collectors and unpopular village officials.
10.
Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla
action on a small scale?
When guerrilla groups begin combat operations such as
raids and ambushes, it is a sign that things are about to escalate.
This is the critical moment in a Phase One insurgency. The
operations in this stage are small confidence-building exercises
that demonstrate that the regime is vulnerable. If successful and the
government is slow or ineffective, the tempo and lethality will
increase. If begun prematurely and the government reacts with
vigor and competence, the guerrillas may be vulnerable to
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government counterattack, as in the case of Che Guevara’s death in
Bolivia (1967).
The following series of messages and news reports are the heart of
this story of the evolution from indifference and near-total disregard to
recognition, engagement, and commitment. They are a sampling of the
more noteworthy intelligence reports and indicate the scope and direction
of both the Honduran insurgent and Honduran counterinsurgency
operations. It was these documents and others that led this writer to
conclude that although the Honduran left was not particularly effective, it
still was out there and needed careful watching. The FSLN success in
Nicaragua and the near-success of the FMLN in El Salvador warned
against dismissing a Honduran insurgency out of hand.
Each message references the Insurgency Indicator Checklist above
and Annex A, Analyzing Insurgency. As you read each message and apply
the indicators, think about the following questions.
Discussion Questions
1. What are the limitations of this framework in the 21st century?
2. Does social media (Twitter, YouTube, blogs, etc.) change the way you
analyze a proto-insurgency?
3. Where else would you look for signs of a proto-insurgency in 21stcentury social media?
4. Does social media activism equate to a proto-insurgency?
5. Should it be added to the list of warning signs?
6. What lessons does the Arab Spring, especially the Egyptian
experience, add to this insurgency framework?
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V. Messages and Reports (M&R)
A. M&R 1-6: July 1982 to July 1984
Over a period of two years, a slow but steady insurgency was
fomenting. These six messages track how, if you have the right questions
and can ascertain the correct answers to these questions, an insurgency can
be identified. Episodes of bombing, assassination, kidnapping, and
development of safe havens are indications that an insurgency is brewing.

Message 1
DATE: 4 JUL 82
LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA
CENTRAL POWER STATION WAS BOMBED BY MEMBERS OF
THE FROYLAN TURCIOS COMMAND, A HONDURAN-BASE CELL
OF THE FMLN [El Salvadoran insurgency]. SEEN AS AN ACT OF
RETALIATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS
FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #5, #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
This act achieved several of the insurgents’ goals. It served notice
on the Honduran government that solidarity existed among all of the leftist
organizations and that an attack on one element was an attack on all. In
addition to the inconvenience of power outages, attacking the power
station gained everyone’s attention in the capital city and demonstrated the
government’s vulnerability.
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Message 2
DATE: 17 SEP 82
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA
CINCHONEROS SEIZED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND HELD
80 HOSTAGES FOR EIGHT DAYS. DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF
HONDURAN, SALVADORAN [Alejandro Montenegro: FMLN] AND
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN LEFTIST ACTIVITISTS, THE
EXPULSION OF U.S. ADVISORS AND WITHDRAWL OF
HONDURAS FROM THE NEWLY-FORMED CENTRAL AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #9 and #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst;
and Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
There is probably no more effective event than a hostage situation.
Whether the release of political prisoners was achieved or not, the fact that
the government was forced into negotiations with the Chinchoneros is
significant. After a week the hostages were released and the guerrillas
were flown to Panama, en route to Cuba. Not only did such an action
demonstrate the government’s weakness in performing its key role of
protecting itself, but it had tremendous domestic and international
propaganda value. In August 1978, a similarly spectacular operation led
by Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora marked the beginning of the end
of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua.

Message 3
DATE: 19 JUL 83
LOCATION: OLANCHO DEPARTMENT
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91 HONDURAN INSURGENTS WITH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
FROM NICARAGUA HAD THE OBJECTIVE OF RALLYING UP TO
3,000 COMBATANTS. BY SEP 83, ALMOST ALL HAD EITHER
BEEN KILLED, CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #3
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support
Once again, intervention in a Central American country was
conducted from a neighboring safe haven/launchpad. It was also an
indication of the insurgency’s anticipated recruitment. That the threat was
eliminated so quickly and thoroughly had a telling effect on the Honduran
government and generated a false sense of security. It left untouched the
potential of Nicaragua as a logistical base for future endeavors. It also
assumed that the other side wouldn’t learn from the experience.

Message 4
DATE: NOV 83
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA
HONDURAN INTELLIGENCE UNCOVERED A PLOT BY THE
PRTC-H TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL ALVAREZ MARTINEZ,
COMMANDER OF THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES. PRTC-H
MEMBERS WERE RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAN PEDRO SULA
WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON HOW TO NEUTRALIZE VIP
BODYGUARDS AND THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #3 and #9
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
This plot, unlike July’s Olancho debacle launched from outside
Honduras (Message #3), was home-grown and more sophisticated. The
Honduran Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido
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Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos de Honduras, or
PRTC-H) training took place in the San Pedro Sula, an area with a history
of radical politics. An assassination of such a key officer as Gen. Martinez
would have had considerable propaganda value and demonstrated the
strength of the insurgents as well as the potential for generating an AOH
overreaction. One aspect of an urban operation is the high-visibility aspect
with lots of witnesses and lots of media. Keep in mind that an act such as
an assassination is theater and the target is not the audience. A crackdown,
whether it works or not, is still grist for the propaganda mill.

Message 5
DATE: 26 MAR 84
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA
FIVE SEPARATE BUT COORDINATED TARGETS STRUCK BY
THE CINCHONEROS INCLUDED THE HONDURAN SUPREME
COURT BUILDING AND A MILITARY SCHOOL IN
TEGUCIGALPA, TWO POLICE STATIONS AND THE
SALVADORAN CONSULATE IN SAN PEDRO SULA
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
This spectacular operation demonstrated the growing
sophistication of the insurgency. Multifaceted and well-timed, it not only
achieved the wounding of the government but also got the region’s
attention. Once again, the urban setting is instructive re: the population
and the media. The capital (Tegucigalpa) and the San Pedro Sula were
“target-rich” environments and pointed out the government’s weaknesses
in protecting its own.
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Message 6
DATE: JUL 84
LOCATION: EL PARAISO
INFILTRATION INTO EL PARAISO DEPARTMENT OF AT LEAST
19 GUERRILLAS TRAINED IN CUBA; MOST DESERTED OR WERE
CAPTURED
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #3 and #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 6, Force and
Coercion
Except for number of guerrillas, this was a repeat of July 1983.
This insurgent setback marked the beginning of a quiet time. For the next
17 months, there was little guerrilla activity to report and an internal threat
almost disappeared. For the Honduran authorities, this was further
indication that all was under control.

B. Reaction
Consistent with our centuries-old policy regarding the Americas
and as part of the Reagan doctrine of aggressively opposing Communism,
the United States was working not only to expel the Soviets and their
Cuban surrogates from Central America but also to upend their clients, the
Sandinistas. In light of this, it is not surprising the Honduran authorities
were focused on the externals and had been since 1979, when the
Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua. When this writer took command
of the 7th SFG in 1985, the unit’s primary role was to support the
Hondurans against the Sandinistas’ external invasion threat.
SF deployments were designed to back-stop and encourage the
Hondurans in repelling that invasion. Annual exercises saw the group
headquarters and several SF detachments attached to the Honduran army
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units for a period of two to three weeks, during which war plans were
exercised.
When queried about their views as to the threats, a large majority
(roughly 7 in 10) of the AOH officers told this writer that the Sandinistas
with their Soviet-made T-55 tanks were the main danger, while the
minority (3 in 10) still viewed El Salvador and her 40,000 combat veterans
as such. When asked if there was an internal threat, these officers
invariably dismissed that idea as having been destroyed in the Olancho
department in 1983 and 1984.
There was one notable exception to this conventional wisdom.
The comments of the Public Security Force (FUSEP) commander
in the La Ceiba region were of a different cast than the military’s. He
believed that he was faced with a budding insurgency on the north coast
and had too little with which to respond. He stated he had talked to his
AOH counterparts and was told if there was a problem it was a “police
matter, not an army job” and he should deal with it. He said with only four
officers and two vehicles he was unable to do much. It could be argued
that FUSEP, heretofore barred from U.S. security assistance, was simply
trying to get a place at the feeding trough. (In 1985, there existed a
Vietnam-era prohibition against supporting police forces. An exemption
would eventually be granted to both Honduras and El Salvador.)
However, the police, being closer to the population and its issues,
usually have a better handle on what was happening in the countryside.
My discussions with U.S. in-country assets mirrored the AOH
position regarding insurgency. They were unanimous that there was no
insurgency and little to be concerned about. This writer had been reading
the Honduras traffic while an analyst at Carlisle’s Strategic Studies
Institute and thought there might be more going on there than was
commonly believed. As a result of these conversations and the traffic, I
modified the focus of our deployments. Each deploying detachment would
continue to co-locate and exercise with those AOH battalions as per the
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war plans. Individual team training objectives were also to continue as
before, but another requirement was included: Each team member was
provided with the Vietnam-era Insurgency Indicator Checklist. They were
instructed to remain objective, to observe, and to report any activity that
might have an effect on their mission to support the AOH in case of a
Sandinista attack. This included looking inward.
The following are a sample of the message traffic between March
and October of 1986, as well as various news reports. By no means does
this cover all the reporting. Because the 7th SF Group had a Military
Intelligence Company as part of its TO&E, it could and did report directly
into the intelligence stream. As we shall see below (23 April 1986),
bureaucratic reaction was not long in coming.
The question is, if you had been in place in Honduras at the time,
what would you have made of these messages? Do you see the same
insurgency indicators as we did? If not, why not? Moreover, if you had
been in SOUTHCOM or SOCOM at this time, what would you have
thought of these messages? Are they persuasive evidence of an
insurgency? What would it have taken to change your mind? Why did it
take us so long to change perceptions on the nature of the threat?

C. M&R 7 March–30 November 1986
After 18 months of inactivity, and complacency on the part of the
Honduran army, the Honduran government, and the United States, the
insurgency again erupted. In eight short months, from May to October
1986, the official reaction shifted from an assessment that there was “not
an insurgency, nor is one likely to develop” (Message #14, 27 May), to the
realization that the insurgent situation in Northern Honduras was a “great
threat to the internal stability of Honduras” (Message #21, 28 October).
Again, these insurgents’ activities follow the checklist referred to earlier.
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Message 7
DATE: 7 MAR 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
LOCATION: LA CUMBRE.
FUSEP SGT KILLED BY LEFTISTS AT AN INSURGENT SAFE
SITE/TRAINING AREA.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #9 and #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
The first indication of instability often is an attack on the police,
the first line of governmental defense. This incident arose when a FUSEP
officer went to investigate reports of strange activity in the hills above La
Cumbre. When he arrived, he was shot and killed. The site was being used
by insurgents for training and indoctrination.

Message 8
DATE: 14 MAR 86
SOURCE 7th SFG
LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA
ANTI-U.S. DEMOSTRATIONS ORCHESTRATED BY PCH. AND
SUPPLEMENTED BY SOPHISTICATED PROPAGANDA IN LA
PRENSA, TARGETING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #4, 5, and 6
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues
In this incident we can see the age-old hot button issue of foreign
presence. Probably no other concern could generate such a wide
agreement among Hondurans as this. Coincidently, little comment was
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made over the low footprint of the nearly invisible Special Forces
detachments deployed down at the battalion level.

News Report 1
DOI 18 March 1986
The Armed Forces will present to national and foreign reporters
today a bus seized in Colomoncague, Itibuca Departmentt, where
ammunition and weapons, supposedly for Salvadoran guerillas, were
carried. Preliminary reports indicate that the vehicle was seized over the
weekend. After a thorough search, lethal weapons were discovered hidden
inside.
The national authorities, in addition to this action, have carried out
several seizures of weapons destined for the FMLN, a guerrilla
organization that has been our territory to subvert order in El Salvador.
The number of people detained has not yet been disclosed.
Colomoncague, in the country’s west, is located 2 km from the Salvadoran
border. There are about 15,000 Salvadoran refugees in this sector.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #3
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; and Sec. 5,
Support
It was quite common to use commercial carriers in support of
insurgent logistics. In El Salvador, for example, a truck bound for the
FMLN was intercepted on the Guatemalan border with several hundred
weapons traced to the Vietnamese army and the Vietnam War.

Message 9
DATE: MAR 86
SOURCE 7th SFG
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LOCATION: JOCON.
JESUITS CONTINUE ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.
REPORTS INDICATE CONGREGATIONS ARE BEING TOLD THAT
TF 135 IS BUILDING A ROAD TO INVADE NICARAGUA
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, and #6
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues
The underlying purpose of the Yoro Road was to improve the
quality of life in the Yoro valley so that the people of the region would be
less likely to fall for Marxist-Leninist propaganda. Opposition came from
the political left in Honduras and worldwide. One of the more outrageous
claims was from some Jesuit priests who told congregations along the path
of the road—specifically in Jocon—that its purpose was an invasion of
Nicaragua. A brief look at a map would show just how ludicrous the
charge was. It is over 100 miles from Jocon in northern Honduras to the
Nicaraguan border, through even more inhospitable terrain than in Yoro
province.12

News Report 2
DATE: 31 March 1986
This weekend special Honduran Army troops are looking for a
group of armed men who have reportedly been sighted by peasants near
the community of Esparta. The search is being conducted by troops of the
4th Infantry Battallion headquartered in the port city of La Ceiba, in
northern Hondruras, with help from light planes of the Honduan Air
Force. … An officer of the 4th Infantry Battallion, who asked to remain
anonymous, said that soldiers from his battalion are combing all the
12

Information in commentary provided by LTC John T. Fishel, SOUTHCOM J-

5.
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mountain area and do not rule out the possibility that “guerrilla cells” have
gone into the jungle.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #10

News Report 3
DATE: 2 April 1986
A Tegucigalpa radio station reported Salvadoran guerillas crossed
into Honduras through Mapulaca, Lempira. The guerillas took over the
town of Los Planes but were expelled by the Honduran Army Special
Forces.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization

Message 10
DTG: 23 APR 86
FM:USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO
TO: CDR 7TH SFGA
REQUEST THAT YOU FIRST SEND YOUR IIR’S TO THE
USDAO/JCIOE, HONDURAS SO THEY CAN EFFECT COUNTRY
TEAM COORDINATION PRIOR TO PUBLICATION
Commentary
The bureaucratic in-fighting began with this relatively innocuous
request. What was really at stake was whose story was going to be told.
Even without analysis, 7th SFG reports on insurgent activities
were viewed as a threat. Both of the embassy’s intelligence entities (DIA
and CIA) had consistently reported “all’s quiet on the Southern Front.”
Once that position was taken, anything that contradicted it was dismissed
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or viewed as a threat. As each detachment returned from its deployment to
Honduras, it was debriefed by the 7th SFG’s S-2 and MI company
personnel. Additionally, each detachment had at least one and usually two
or three operations and intelligence-trained personnel who could assist in
assessing the information gathered while in-country. What was being
injected into the intelligence flow was raw information, not distilled
intelligence. And while no one was making any sweeping judgments as
yet, it was obvious that something was afoot.
The issue was in part one of turf or rice bowls and, as General
Galvin so aptly put it, stovepipes were a major problem faced by our
embassies. SouthCom was dependent on several intelligence sources, but
the major contributors—CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and TF-B—
were in Honduras, and they all had the same story. Inertia prevented them
from thinking beyond their assessments. Gen Galvin recognized that his
best source of intelligence was the all-source CAJITF in Washington, and
not the embassy (see Annex B).

Message 11
DTG: 29 APR 86
FM: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC
TO: USCINSCO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
SUBJ: INSURGENT ANALYSIS
IN SHORT THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE DOUBT WE ARE
CONFRONTING SOPHISTICATED ORCHESTRATION OF A
MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS WHICH WILL
BE FUELED BY THE GROWING ALLIANCE WITH
NARCOTRAFICANTES, CUBA, LIBYA AND PERIPHERALLY THE
SOVIET UNION, WHICH VIEW VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN
THE REGION AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
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Commentary
This most welcome message came at a time when the theater
intelligence entities were up in arms over the 7th’s reporting. Remember,
the 7th was not doing the analysis but simply reporting directly into the
intelligence stream. SOCOM J-2, however, did analyze the traffic and
took the position reflected above. This did nothing to reduce the angst and
noise levels within the theater intelligence community. It would take
divine intervention or the CinC to turn that around.

Message 12
DOI: 05 MAY 86
SOURCE 7th SFG
REPORTED STUDENTS FROM THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
WERE USING AN ECOLOGY ORGANIZATION, AS A FRONT TO
SUPPORT A 12-MAN HONDURAN TERRORIST GROUP, TRAINED
IN CUBA BY LIBYANS WHOSE MISSION WAS TO CAUSE
DAMAGE TO PALMEROLA AFB IN HONDURAS
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and# 6
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst;
and Sec. 5, Support
It has long been understood that there is a connection between
some ecology groups and insurgency and that an ecology organization
might be used as a front. The Honduran Palmerola Air Base had become
the focus of leftist propaganda efforts because of the base’s central and
visible role in support of all U.S. military and civic action activities.
Cooperation between some regimes (e.g., Cuba, Libya) and
various terrorist groups had become sophisticated to the point that there
was a terrorist or nationalist group with access to just about every type of
expertise or training facility.
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Message 13
DOI: 21 MAY 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
A COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL (ESCUELA RADIO FONICA)
OPERATED BY CATHOLIC PRIEST ON THE NORTH COAST OF
HONDURAS IS REVEALED TO BE A FRONT FOR SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTED BY FUNDS SENT THROUGH
SWITZERLAND
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, #6, and #7
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 3, Catalyst; Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 9,
Other Questions
Described by its proponents as the interpretation of Christian faith
through the consciousness of the poor and by its critics as a “Christianized
Marxism,” liberation theology grew in the Latin American church during
the 1950s and 1960s and provided a framework for analysis and
interpretation of class and wealth distribution. Among the initiatives
associated with this theology among the Catholic clergy were the “base
communities” advocated as the preferred path for social activism by the
1968 Medellin Conference of the Roman Catholic bishops. Created in
rural and urban areas, these Christian base communities organized
illiterate but faithful farmers into autonomous economic and religious
associations under the guidance of the local priest or laity. The community
members found that their association within these groups supported the
idea that Jesus had come to save them and to care for them here and in the
afterlife. The active pursuit of social justice appealed to the community
members and the local priesthood alike. The Marxist portion of liberation
theology encouraged the alliance with Cuban-backed activists that
emerged in the later 1970s in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile,
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and elsewhere. For the insurgents, this alliance gave them the legitimacy
they had been denied. For the counterinsurgents, it added a whole new
dimension to the struggle for the hearts and minds of the population.13

Message 14
DTG: 27 MAY 86
FM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
TO: ALL
SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE SITUATION IN HONDURAS
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN HONDURAS, BUT
THERE IS CURRENTLY NOT AN INSURGENCY, NOR IS ONE
LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS. THE
EXISTING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT ADEQUATE
TO SUPPORT ACTIVITY OTHER THAN LIMITED URBAN
TERRORISM FOR A SHORT PERIOD
Commentary
Here we see SOUTHCOM still not yet convinced of a serious
threat. This view can be attributed to a number of causes, including the
near-total focus on the border as reflected in the assessment of the U.S. incountry intelligence community I had noted a year earlier. There was still
the same near-total focus of the AOH and its dismissal of the north coast
activity as “a police [FUSEP] matter.” There was the near-total focus of
the Central American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) on the war
in El Salvador and the CIA’s Contra operations against Nicaragua. The
lesson here is that all bureaucracies suffer from inertia or momentum and
are not easily diverted. Group think affects analysis. A fresh set of eyes
and ears may not always be welcomed.
13

Information in this commentary provided by LtC Robert Watson USA Ret and
the author.
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Five days after the CINC’s 27 May message, I sent him the
following letter:
2 June 1986
Dear General Galvin:
By now you should have received the two promised messages on
the Phase I Insurgency and the evaluation of the Honduran Battalions. I
hope these prove useful to you.
There appears to be a difference of opinion regarding just what a
Phase I Insurgency looks like and our willingness to admit it exists. In a
recent message (SOUTHCOME SCJ-I, subject: SUBVERSIVE
SITUATION IN HONDURAS, 272100ZMAY86), the point was stressed
that there is no insurgency in Honduras. The message describes what is
taking place in Honduras and then denies an insurgency exists. It is not my
intention to debate over this point. Since 1979, I’ve been personally
involved in the ongoing definitional dispute over what Low Intensity
Conflict is or is not. The rhetoric produced during that debate and now
with the insurgency in Honduras appear to me as distinctions without
differences.
What gives me more concern regarding the message is we may be
headed toward the oft-repeated error of waiting until it is a recognizable
insurgency before taking preemptive steps to deal with it. If we deny the
existence of a threat because it is not serious or denigrate the guerillas’
capacity to obuild infrastructures or generate propaganda, we will I
believe make a serious mistake. The Hondurans are focusing where we
focus, to date that has been largely on the conventional threat from
Nicaragua. They will, as were the Salvadorans, be slow to relook the
internal causes of popular discontent. In El Salvador before October 1979,
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there was a preoccupation with outside support of the guerillas. This
worked to the detriment of an internal analysis – nation-building answer to
the root causes of the insurgency. Later, during my tour, I asked the
Salvadoran officers why this was so. Their response was their leadership
knew only how to fight one way—conventionally. It was a most difficult
task to redirect that Army inward even after their insurgency had almost
(or had?) reached Phase III. What I’m concerned with is the inertia we
may encourage if we fail to press the Hondurans to look inward and
prepare for the struggle that will inevitably escalate. While it is my fondest
hope Danny Ortega will have an attack of terminal stupidity and cross the
border for real, I doubt if it will happen. I have no doubts that we could
handle such an eventuality.
I’ve given much thought to what our opponents seem to have
learned of late. I believe the key lessons they’ve learned from Grenada et
al. are:
“Don’t permit the noise level to penetrate the U.S. consciousness
again.”
“Don’t give the gringos an opportunity to do what they do best—
conventional war.”
“Keep it low on the spectrum.”
“If the insurgency in Honduras can be kept alive and growing and
at the same time be kept below the U.S. attention level, then the chances
of success will be greater.”
To counter our enemy’s new-found wisdom, I propose we continue
to work quietly with our Honduran counterparts to develop their
counterinsurgency capability. We should develop not only their military
capacity to conduct counter-guerilla operations but also develop the
requisite sensitivity and capacity to deal with the non-lethal aspects of an
insurgency threat, e.g., nation-building (PSYOPS and Civil Affairs). It
costs less in comparison with a conventional buildup and will make the
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Honduran Army even more respected by the people it is pledged to
defend.
The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) stands ready to assist you
to that and any other end.

Message 15
DOI: 10 JUN 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
REPORTED THREATS FROM LEFTIST/AUTHENTIC FACTION OF
THE HONDURAN PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION TO
INITIATE STRIKES THROUGHOUT THE EDUCATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND AMONG LEFTIST LABOR MOVEMENTS IF
THEIR DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION WERE
NOT MET.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator # 4, #5, and #7
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst;
Sec. 7, Legitimacy; and Sec. 9, Other Issues

Message 16
DOI: 19 JUN 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
REPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY
GROUP (ETAS- AUXILLARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL OF
SECURITY) BY THE PCH [Honduran Communist Party], FUTH
[Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers] AND SITRATERCO [Labor
Union of the Tela Railroad Company] LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS TO
MONITOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE EL
PROGRESSO AREA.
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Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #2
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support
By now, the frequency of reports from El Progresso indicted that
this area was a focal point of subversive goings-on. The El Progresso area
and the nearby university campus at San Pedro Sula had a long history of
anti-government activity.

News Report 4
DATE: 22 July 1986
Six Salvadoran guerrillas were killed in a clash with the Honduran
Army, it was reported officially today in Tegucigalpa. The military clash
occurred last Friday in the sector of Los Filos in the western department of
Lempira on the Salvadoran border. The report by the Honduran Army
states that the Honduran troops did not sustain any casualties, despite the
fact that they were ambushed by the guerillas while patrolling the border.
It also states that the slain rebels were buried in the place where they were
killed to prevent their being preyed upon by buzzards or jungle animals.
The Honduran soldiers who fought the Salvadoran guerrillas
belonged to the Special Forces and the 12th Infantry Batallion. The report
adds that the fighting occurred in the same region where a soldier was
killed last week when he stepped on a mine made and placed by the rebels.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

News Report 5
DATE: 28 July 1986
“Terrorism Alert”
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Today the Pentagon ordered all U.S. diplomatic offices and
civilian and military installations in Honduras to establish a maximun
security alert due to the fear of terrorist attacks. [These orders prohibit
visit to urban areas unless on specific missions.]
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #2 and #4
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion

News Report 6
DATE: 9 August 1986
“Army and FUESP Conduct Anti-Terrorist Operation”
Upon orders from General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, the
Armed Forces General Command has proceeded to carry out an operation
throughout the nation to control and prevent any act of terrorism which
affects the citizenry. This operation is being carried out jointly by
members of the Public Security Forces (FUSEP) and soldiers of various
Armed Forces Units, who are being deployed to various areas night and
day and are asking citizens to show their identification papers. … Military
authorities hereby urge the citizens, particularly those who have to travel
at night due to their studies or work, to carry their identification papers
and thus avoid problems concerning their identity.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #2, #4, and #8

Message 17
DOI: 11 AUG 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
EDITORIALS IN “LA TRIBUNA” COMPLAINING OF HONDURAN
GOVERNMENTS INABILITY TO IMPOSE ORDER AND
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GUARANTEEING SECURITY OF ITS CITIZENS. SUGGEST ARMED
FORCES COULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IF GOVERNMENT
IS INCAPABLE OF IMPOSING “ORDER”
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #4 and #7
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 7, Legitimacy
A time-tested technique for insurgents has been to portray the
government as unable to maintain order or to protect the population. A
weak government invites another government, or a coup. Alternatively, a
government goaded into overreaction plays into the insurgents’ hands
when in the process of restoring order it creates unacceptable levels of
collateral damage.

Message 18
DOI: 15 AUG 86
SOURCE: Southern Command J2
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT HAVE
CONTACTED VARIOUS HONDURAN RADICAL LEFTIST GROUPS
AND REQUESTED THAT THEY HELP TO DESTABILIZE THE
HONDURAN GOVERNMENT AND DISTRUPT DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTIONARY FRONT THROUGH THE USE OF VIOLENCE
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #3
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support
The linkage between the Sandinistas and radical groups in
Honduras is evident in this intercept.

Message 19
DOI: 29 AUG 86
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SOURCE: 7th SFG
SOURCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO VARIOUS SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR COMMAND STRUCTURE: PROGRESSIVE STUDENT
MOVEMENT (MEP) TWO LEADERS, TWO ADVISORS, TWO
COURIERS, ONE FINANCIAL SUPPORTER DAGOBERTA
PADILLA STUDENT FRONT (FREDAP) LEADER, VICEPRESIDENT, LEGAL ADVISOR, FOUR ASSISTANTS OMAR
RIVERA, MARIO MENDOZA, AND SAUL “SOCRATES” CUELLO
ARDON HAVE BEEN NAMED AS LEADERS OF THE “FIFTH
COLUMN” IN EL PROGRESSO, YORO. THIS GROUP IS
REPORTEDLY CONTROLLED BY HONDURAN COMMUNISTS
(NFI) AND NICARAGUAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. [Note: This
level of detail was typical of 7th SFG’s reporting.]
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and #3
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support

At this point, things began to change. On September 28, 1986, the
7th SF Group Commander and one of the 7th’s recently returned B
Detachment Commanders briefed USCINCSO with latest set of IIRs. The
briefing highlighted the escalation and cumulative effects of insurgent
activities. At the end of the briefing, General Galvin let it be known that
he had sufficient information to believe that a Phase One insurgency
existed on the north coast. His exact words were, “I now have the smoking
gun I need. …”
With the CinC on board, it did not take long for a major climate
change to be reflected in the message traffic.
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Message 20
DTG: 08 OCT 86
FM: DA WASH DC
TO: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC
SUBJ: SOCOM REPORTING IN USSOUTHCOM AOR
THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT OF 7TH SFG PERSONNEL IN
PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE INFO TO 470TH MIGP* PERSONNEL
IS TO BE COMMENDED….THE TRIAL PERIOD OF 60 DAYS HAS
EXPIRED, AND HAS RESULTED IN THE PUBLISHING OF 20
BIOGRAPHIC IIR’S AND 7 ORDER OF BATTLE IIR’S.
2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT
ITEMS:
A. SFG SOLDIERS HAVE INFO VALUABLE TO
SOUTHCOM….
[Note: The 470th MI Group was SouthCom’s MI unit based in the
Canal Zone.]
Commentary
The 7th SFG’s contribution to the understanding of the insurgents’
organization was the result of paying close attention to the detachments’
surroundings and of establishing contacts with a wide-ranging segment of
Honduran society.

Message 21
DOI: 28 OCT 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
LTC ROMERO, 4TH BN [La Ceiba], STATES THE INSURGENT
SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS TO BE A “GREAT
THREAT TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF HONDURAS.”
RECENT CLASHES WITH ARMED AND ORGANIZED
SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS, DISCOVERY OF WEAPONS AND FOOD
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CACHES, AND INFORMATION ON INSURGENT CELLS AND
SUPORTERS, HE SAID, WERE ONLY THE BEGINNING OF AN
UNRAVELING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE STORY.
ROMERO INDICATED A LINK BETWEEN INSURGENTS AND
“NARCO-INSURGENTS”. LARGE AMOUNTS OF MARIJUANA
FIELDS DISCOVERED NEAR TOCOA IN EARLY OCTOBER
WORTH 7 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS LINKED TO SUBVERSIVES.
THE ONBOARD COMPUTER OF AN AIRPLANE CARRYING 1,000
KILOS OF COCAINE DOWNED IN LA CEIBA 8 OCT 86
CONTAINED COORDINATES FOR A CLANDESTINE AIRFIELD
NEAR ARENAL, YORO. ARENAL IS A CENTER FOR LEFTIST
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators # 1, #2, #3, and #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; Sec. 6, Force and Coercion;
and Sec. 9, Other Questions
Beginning in 1985, an expert from Ft Bragg’s 9th Psychological
Operations Battalion was attached to each deploying A Detachment. He
was charged with playing the role of “commissar” (political/public
affairs/psy ops adviser) and was to participate in detachment seminar
discussions on the insurgency indicators (see above Indicator Checklist)
and what, if anything, was going on in their area. He also functioned as
another set of eyes in assessing the AOH unit the team was training. After
a suitable period, the teams invited their Honduran counterparts to sit in
and participate. In time, Honduran LtC Romero became a devoted
participant in these “seminar” discussions. It is obvious from these
messages that he became a convert. While it is possible that this
conversion may have been in part the result of wanting a piece of the pie,
there is little doubt there was something going on, and he and others soon
began to focus on the potential of an insurgency in his area of operations.
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The same day, the U.S. Defense Attaché reported the following:
Message 22
DTG: 28 OCT 86
FM: USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO
TO: DIA WASHDC
SUBJ: HO MILITARY SHIFT RESOURCES TO
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
COMMENTS: LTC ROMERO IS TAKING THE INSURGENT
SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS QUITE SERIOUSLY.
APPARENTLY, THE CINC AND JOINT STAFF ALSO CONSIDER
THE PROBLEM THERE TO BE EXTENSIVE AND THREATENING.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicators #2 and #3
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; Sec. 5, Support
Not only had the U.S. point of view been altered but at least one
major Honduran commander, LtC Romero, now saw the insurgency as a
real threat. How was it possible that the Honduran military changed its
point of view? There is a case to be made that the Hondurans saw the
threat as one that could be used to increase U.S. aid. The AOH viewed
U.S. aid to the Contras and to the ESAF as a zero-sum game and were not
happy with how little they were getting. As far as the drug issue, one has
to look no further than Colombia to see the advantages of linking the
guerrillas with drugs. Insurgents historically have derived their support
from the locals, the opposition, their own manufacturing, and from a
sponsor. The evolution of drugs as a source of finance began with
guerrillas availing themselves of the drug wealth in a symbiotic relation
with producers. Later, they cut out the drug producers and began
producing it themselves. By the 1980s, insurgents were no longer as
dependent on clandestine resupply. The logistics of insurgency had
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changed to the point where insurgent movements that had the drug
advantage were almost financially independent.
The joke in El Salvador was the FMLN could afford state-of-theart communications equipment that was better than what the U.S. was
providing the ESAF. It could be ordered by cell phone from the best
manufacturers, paid by credit card, drawn from a secure foreign account,
and FedExed to the users.

Message 23
DOI: 04 NOV 86
SOURCE: 7th SFG
A FUSEP AGENT WAS KILLED ON 2 NOV 86 BY SUSPECTED
SUBVERSIVES IN THE NOMBRE DE DIOS MOUNTAINS.
Commentary
Insurgency Indicator #10
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion
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D. The End of the Case, the End of an Era
By the beginning of 1987 SouthCom J-2, Col John Stewart, had
published an extensive study entitled “Honduras: The Phase One
Insurgency on the North Coast.” This publication made it official
although, as noted above, General Galvin’s position had already had a
salutary effect on the intelligence community.
In Honduras, combined AOH/FUSEP units with U.S. intelligence
and logistics support took the offensive. These combat operations
triggered a number of contacts with the guerrillas, particularly in the
Nombre de Dios Mountains. By the year’s end, armed field elements of
the insurgency were out of business. Contra and Sandinista units still kept
things stirred up on the border, however, and the war in El Salvador built
in intensity. AOH units throughout the country became more effective in
their dealings with the Honduran population. (See Annex C.) In November
1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and the El Salvadoran FMLN’s “Final
Offensive” failed. The Soviets ceased supporting the Sandinista regime
and, by extension, the FMLN.
In April 1990, Nicaraguan president and Sandinista Daniel Ortega
had an attack of terminal stupidity and allowed himself to be un-elected.
Violeta Chamorra’s surprise victory ended both Sandinista and Contra
border incursions into Honduras. Peace came to El Salvador a year later
with the signing of the peace treaty. In September of 1992 the bolsones
territorial issues were resolved, with Honduras getting two-thirds of the
disputed territory. By 1993, a Central American Free Trade Agreement
was in place.
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VI. Annexes
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Annex A: Analyzing Insurgency
by Colonel John D. Waghelstein, USA (Ret.) and Dr. Donald
Chisholm14
February 2006
Conventional War is to Irregular War as intercollegiate lacrosse is to
Indian lacrosse. The former is played on a clearly defined field by a
prescribed and equal number of players, under defined rules for a set
time period. The Indian brand was played by any, and usually unequal,
number on each side, with neither rules nor time constraints over an
undefined area. Those who would play the Indian brand of the game
should not expect to be governed by NCAA rules.
— James Trinniman, late Professor, U.S. Army War College

Planning and executing effective conventional combat operations
begins with practical analysis of the enemy, that is, imposing a structure
on the problem, devising several plausible courses of action, and
ascertaining which course of action is likely to achieve the strategic
objective. Established planning tools such as the Commander’s Estimate
of the Situation (CES) or the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
were developed as problem-solving tools for understanding and defeating
14

Dr. Donald Chisholm is Professor and Head, Contemporary Operations and
Environments Division, in the Joint Military Operations Department of the U.S.
Naval War College. He earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science
from the University of California, Berkeley. His published research addresses
operational planning; military personnel systems; cognitive and organizational
limits on rationality; organizational adaptation; organizational failure and
reliability; and privatization of public activities. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:
Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 17931941 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001) received the 2001 RADM
Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature.
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largely symmetrical opponents in conventional combat operations between
the armed forces of states. They have been wonderfully effective in this
context.15
Devising and executing successful counterinsurgency campaigns
also demands effective problem solving.16 Getting the analysis right is
critical. Although it might seem appropriate to employ proven
CES/MDMP planning tools to problems of insurgency, these tools have
shown themselves less well-adapted to this context than they are to
conventional combat operations. The CES and MDMP represent
formalized expressions of problem solving as developed and adapted for
the military context during a historical period in which most military
tactical and operational thought was directed toward the successful
conduct of major conventional combat operations between states (mostly
Western) with similarly organized and equipped militaries. They represent
15

John Dewey pointed out long ago that the human decision maker is first and
foremost a problem solver, following, more or less, several steps to make nontrivial decisions: recognizing and identifying a problem (an occasion for a
decision), imposing a cause-and-effect structure on that problem, generating
alternative solutions, evaluating those alternatives comparatively, and choosing
an alternative. Dewey’s insights provided the foundation for the work of Herbert
A. Simon and others in the field of modern cognitive science. See John Dewey,
The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1985) (originally
published 1927).
16
Although we focus here on the analysis of insurgency as an essential precursor
to devising an effective counterinsurgency campaign (whether in support of a
host nation or as an occupying power), there are also implications for those
occasions on which the U.S. may find itself as a matter of policy providing
support to insurgency, as it did not so long ago in places such as Nicaragua and
Afghanistan. Tools for analyzing insurgency do exist. The CIA developed its
“Guide to Analysis of Insurgency.” There are also Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and
Terrorism (London: Brassey’s, 2005), which has been used at National Defense
University, and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(New York: Praeger, 1964) used at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff
School.
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one useful method of problem solving but do not exhaust the range of
possible practical methods.17
Insurgencies represent what Simon has called “ill-structured”
problems, and others have referred to as “ill-defined” or “wicked”
problems.18 It is not that insurgencies are without structure; rather, the
decision maker does not know very much about that structure, in part
because it may be entirely novel, in part because such problems typically
involve a large number of variables that interact in important, non-simple
ways; that is, they are problems of “organized complexity.”19 The decision
maker’s primary challenge is to ascertain what those variables are and
how they interact, allowing him to move the problem of insurgency from
one that is ill-structured to one that is well-structured, and become more
susceptible of manipulation and amelioration if not solution. That is, the
bulk of the energy expended will typically be devoted to structuring the
problem followed by generating alternative courses of action. 20 Absent
reasonable accuracy in assessing the problem’s structure, no courses of
action developed will solve that problem.
17

We hasten to point out that the analytic instrument outlined in this paper is not
inconsistent with the CES/MDMP, and with analysis to come we should be able
to outline how they complement each other and may be meshed together. We do
not here consider Operational Net Assessment.
18
See Herbert A. Simon, “The Structure of Ill Structured Problems,“ Artificial
Intelligence 4(1973): 181-201. In like manner, “wicked“ problems are to be
distinguished from “tame“ problems.
19
See Warren Weaver, “Science and Complexity,“ American Scientist 36(1948):
536-544. Weaver argued that the problems facing the physical sciences
comprised three general types: simple problems with few variables and simple
interactions; problems of disorganized complexity, with many variables, but
whose interactions are essentially random and susceptible of effective
summarizing by measures of central tendency and dispersion; and problems of
organized complexity. The last type of problem is that most likely to present
itself to the decision maker as ill-structured.
20
See Donald Chisholm, “Problem Solving and Institutional Design,“ Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory X(1996).
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Several specific reasons fall out from this general foundation as to
why the CES/MDMP planning tools are relatively less effective in
converting insurgencies from ill-structured to well-structured status than
for addressing more conventional conflicts.
I. Assumptions
Because the CES/MDMP planning tools were not intended for
comprehending insurgencies, their embedded assumptions about what
matters in the analysis do not match the essential elements of the structure
of insurgencies: key factors are excluded, while others are
overemphasized. Insurgencies are not primarily military problems
(although they inevitably involve security issues and may include military
operations). Concomitantly, the structures of insurgency are considerably
more complex: their constituent parts are at root social, economic, and
political. However, the oft-repeated truism that the “center of gravity is the
people” does not take one very far in devising a counterinsurgency
campaign to defeat a specific insurgency. The truism that countering
insurgency is first and foremost a political, not a military, problem and
that effectively countering insurgency therefore requires application of all
elements of national power, not just the military, also does not provide
much practical guidance for campaign planning, especially when military
factors are more readily analyzed and measured. Using such conventional
planning tools, therefore, can and has resulted in an undue emphasis on
military force in counterinsurgency campaigns, undercutting the
effectiveness of such campaigns.21

21

We are encouraged by recent trends in planning military operations toward
more comprehensive analysis that incorporates and accounts for key non-military
variables.
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II. Variation
Insurgencies differ far more from one another in pertinent ways
than do conventional combat operations. Such differences are typically
relatively subtle and nuanced. Notwithstanding their surface similarities,
this obtained even during the Cold War heyday of communist-backed
insurgencies.22 Given the high probability that the U.S. will, for the
foreseeable future, find itself engaging in support to counterinsurgency
across a wide range of states, many of them non-Western, variation in the
structures of insurgency seems only likely to increase. Distinguishing two
basic types of insurgency—doctrinal or revolutionary insurgency, and
insurgency as part of a war of liberation—proved an important step
forward four decades ago, but does not provide sufficient analytic leverage
for dealing with contemporary insurgencies.23
The rise of what some have called a “global Islamist insurgency”
that may target individual states but maintains pretensions to an end to
Western power and the creation of a sort of supra-national “caliphate”
suggests strongly that the range of types of insurgency is being
significantly expanded, as do alliances between insurgents and criminal
gangs.24 That is to say, today we do not have an adequate taxonomy for
categorizing the varieties of insurgencies we will encounter. We cannot
simply assign a specific insurgency to a particular category and proceed
22

Although the communists generally tried to present a common face to the
West, profound differences of opinion characterized the various communist
theorists and practitioners of insurgency, from Lenin to Mao to Castro and
Guevara, quite apart from differences across the cultures in which they were
attempting to foment and support insurgencies. The variation across communist
insurgencies confronted during the Cold War, however, pales in comparison with
the insurgent variation we confront today.
23
See Galula (1964).
24
See Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army, “Countering Global
Insurgency, A Strategy for the War on Terrorism,“ Canberra & Washington,
D.C., September-November 2004.
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from there to select from a pre-existing menu of responses associated with
that category.
III. Evolution
In contrast with the requirements for planning and executing
conventional combat operations, the origins and etiology of any given
insurgency matter. Consequently, understanding insurgency, generally,
and a given insurgency in particular, depends on clear, practical,
historically grounded social, economic, and political analysis, combined
with sound understanding of the cultural context in which the insurgency
takes place. The practical lesson of these convergent factors is that no
single analytic template will work across all insurgencies, even for
countering insurgency manifested in a particular time and relatively
confined place.25
At the same time, the historical record plainly shows that
insurgency, both generally and in the specific case, has been remarkably
adaptive in response to counterinsurgency campaigns and new
circumstances, and often in very short order. During the present period,
characterized by fast-paced technological innovation, new tools are daily
becoming available to insurgents and potential insurgents, who have
demonstrated remarkable speed in adaptation and adoption.26 Oddly,
Linn’s analysis of the post-Spanish American War insurgency in the
Philippines revealed, for example, that, even restricting focus to Northern Luzon,
variation across small regions was substantial enough to render ineffective any
approach that sought to treat the insurgency as a unitary actor with a common
structure. See Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 19001901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,“ Military Affairs
51(1987): 62-66.
26
See, for example, International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading
the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report N°50 – 15 February 2006, for an
analysis of the insurgents’ execution of a sophisticated information operations
campaign against the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government.
25
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insurgents read, and they know about emerging theories of warfare, and
they study their opponents’ ways of doing business as assiduously as we
study theirs—if not more so. The implication is that even as we attempt to
discern the structure of any given insurgency, its structure is likely to be
changing in ways relevant to how we attempt to counter it. Given the
empirical record of the requirement to counter insurgencies for a decade or
longer, we may be confident that the structure of the insurgency will
change profoundly. The challenge will be to comprehend the insurgency
faster than the pace at which it adapts or otherwise changes, while
simultaneously assessing secular trends in the structure of the
insurgency.27
IV. Actors
The alpha and omega of analyses of insurgency are not our own
forces and those of our foe. Rather, understanding insurgency requires that
we consider the focal population, its government, the insurgents’ rank and
file, and the insurgents’ leadership, along with institutions both secular
and religious, other actors external to the focal nation, both state and nonstate, along with, at times, the U.S. population. Central to this part of the
analysis is to understand the complex relationships among these actors. As
we note below, key to success in countering insurgency is discerning,
understanding, and exploiting (reinforcing or disaggregating) the seams
among these central actors.

27

International Crisis Group (2006), for example, argues that the present
insurgency in Iraq has evolved through three distinct stages, as analyzed through
the public statements of its various components: competition, consolidation, and
confidence. Additionally, we would be wise to anticipate an initial period of
ineffective groping in the dark in any counterinsurgency campaign.
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V. Sequential versus Cumulative
Although U.S. thinking about conventional combat now tends
toward simultaneity and non-linearity in operations and campaigns
combined with near-continuous analysis and adjustment, sequence and
phasing remain the underlying architecture of our operational concepts
and planning processes. And while counterinsurgency campaigns are
susceptible of conceptualization in terms of broad phases, by force of
circumstance those phases overlap in important ways, leaving their
boundaries indefinite —largely because of the myriad actions they
necessarily contain and the importance of the incremental, cumulative
effects, vice sequential execution and completion, of those actions.28
VI. Doctrine
Notwithstanding encouraging recent efforts (not yet secular
trends), doctrine for counterinsurgency has been and remains much less
robust than for conventional combat operations, in part because the
problem is less amenable to distillation in formal doctrine, but also
because insurgency has historically been treated as an aberration
distracting from the military’s real business of major conventional combat
operations against similarly disposed armed forces of other states.29
Doctrine has usually lagged the evolution of insurgency and in any case
has remained so non-specific as to constitute an inadequate guide to
28

The empirical record plainly shows, for example, that counterinsurgency
campaigns based on the assumption that development (i.e., schools, health
facilities, utilities infrastructure, and the like) can only follow in train of the
establishment of internal security are not destined to be successful.
29
This phenomenon is not new. It was as significant in the 19th century as it has
been during the past several decades. See John D. Waghelstein, “Preparing the
US Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865-1891,“
Small Wars and Insurgencies 10(1999): 1-33. In the present setting the Army’s
draft field manual for counterinsurgency and the Marine Corps’ revision and
update of its classic Small Wars Manual are two very positive developments.
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understanding and action. Consequently, effective counterinsurgency
planning and execution to date has in practice relied upon the intuitive or
implicit knowledge of the experienced professional, often an iconoclast
operating at the margins of the mainstream military.30 Indeed,
counterinsurgency campaigns have more probability of success when
devised by professionals with broad personal experience of insurgency.
VII. Systems Perspective
The complexity of insurgency, in combination with its adaptive
and evolutionary character and the typically long time frame for
countering it, suggests strongly the practical value of treating it from a
systems perspective. We do not here consider the relative utility of the
various systems models as a basis for an informed perspective on
insurgency. However, our approach is more consistent with a systems
approach drawn from a biological rather than from a physical metaphor.31
VIII. Comparative Analysis
To the extent that systematic analysis of insurgency can be
codified and formalized, it requires explicit comparison across historical
30

Bernard Fall and Edward Lansdale personify those military officers residing at
the margin of their military establishments who nonetheless prove highly
effective in counterinsurgency. Fall was a member of the French resistance
during World War II, also serving in a Moroccan infantry division. See Bernard
Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,“ Naval
War College Review (Winter 1998): 46-57. As an Army intelligence officer,
Lansdale served in the OSS during World War II, in 1947 transferring to the Air
Force from which he ultimately retired as a brigadier general. See Edward
Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), and Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The
Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).
31
For an excellent practical example of a systems approach to understanding
insurgency, see Kilcullen (2004), Appendix C, in which he analyzes the present
insurgency in Iraq.
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insurgencies. This allows highlighting characteristics common to all or
most of them. Demarcating those factors peculiar to specific insurgencies
becomes possible only with an appropriate analytical framework. In turn,
such comparison and analysis must rest upon a solid foundation of the
appropriate practical questions about insurgencies; absent such a common
metric, no comparisons can be effected. Such analysis, we believe, will
never submit to the same degree of formality as the CES/MDMP achieves
for conventional operations. It will inevitably require an extraordinarily
high degree of art on the part of the analyst.
IX. Questions
We do not suggest that insurgencies are so obscure and opaque
that they remain fundamentally resistant to effective analysis, or that
insurgents are inevitably invincible. To the contrary, like all mortals they
have feet of clay and sometimes they can be downright stupid: Che
Guevara comes to mind. We cannot, however, count on such inadequacy
as a matter of course. Rather, defeating them requires asking the right
questions and answering them with reasonable clarity and accuracy.
Thus, offered here is a set of questions founded in practical
experience, a systems perspective, and key concepts of operational art:
strategic objective; center of gravity; critical strengths, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities; operational factors; and decisive points.32 These questions
focus our attention on the beliefs and attitudes of the key players in
insurgencies, their capabilities for action, and the relationships among
these players. Posing and answering these questions, it is believed, will
32

The Principles of MOOTW (Security, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Restraint,
Perseverance, and Objective; often remembered as SLURPO) aid the military
planner in distinguishing the implications for devising operations and campaigns
addressing problems of insurgency from those of conventional combat
operations. Thus, they offer general guidelines for thinking about problems of
counterinsurgency.
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allow the officer confronted with understanding a real-world insurgency to
assess and comprehend its fundamental characteristics in order to develop
a plan for an effective counterinsurgency campaign, with emphasis on
exploitation of critical vulnerabilities.
Although of necessity listed in linear order, we do not thereby
suggest a priority for the questions nor a sequence in which they should be
asked and answered. The several categories of question are also
interrelated, though shown discretely below: answers to one will have
important implications for the others. Finally, we note that not every
question provided here will be relevant to every insurgency, but its
relevance should at least be considered; and that we do not suppose that
these questions exhaust the relevant questions for insurgencies of the
contemporary period or for those that will arise in the future.
1. Underlying Issues
Insurgencies do not find fertile ground in a population in which
most sectors are generally contented with their lot in life. Underlying
conditions of real grievance are necessary, usually described by a
mismatch between sentiment of a significant portion of the population and
government policies, especially the provision of public goods and
services. One implication for counterinsurgency is for the government to
make significant substantive changes in its policies in order to strengthen
its ties to and legitimacy in the eyes of its population. Some grievances
may result from factors well beyond the ability of the government to
redress.

What issues have the insurgents articulated as their sources
of grievance (e.g., land distribution; ethnic, religious, or other
discrimination and allied human rights concerns; control of natural
resources by multinational corporations or a central government;
access to government offices; access to scarce resources such as
health, education, or other basic services, etc.)?
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What are the grievances of the population? Would a
reasonable person consider them to be valid? Validity of grievance
is not effectively assessed by objective condition.33

Are the articulated grievances of the population and those
of the insurgency the same?

What does the government believe to be the grievances of
the population? Does it consider those grievances to be valid?

Are the articulated grievances of the population the same as
those perceived by the government?

Has the government made genuine efforts to address these
grievances? (For example, the Sultan of Oman improved health
services, expanded education, and built roads to outdo the
insurgents in the Dhofar rebellion [1962–1976].) Are these
grievances practically addressable, or are they beyond the
immediate capacity of the government (e.g., major social and
economic dislocations caused by globalization)?
2. Underlying Characteristics
Grasping the basic characteristics of the population is essential to
analyzing the nature and structure of conflict in the focal state. These
characteristics set the historical frame of reference for the conflict under
consideration and define the parameters for possible courses of action.
They are also likely to be suggestive of courses of action aimed at
reinforcing or widening seams among insurgents or between insurgents
and the population.

What are the primary characteristics
(political/social/economic/religious) of the population? What are
33

What matters is gap between expectations and experience. On this essential
point, see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1970); and David O. Sears, The Politics of Violence: The New Urban
Blacks and the Watts Riot (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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the basic cleavages in the population (e.g., Tutsi and Hutu in
Rwanda)? Do these cleavages reinforce each other or are they
cross-cutting (e.g., religious alignments cut across ethnic
differences in Sri Lanka)?

What are the primary characteristics
(political/social/economic/religious) of the insurgent leadership?
Of the insurgency’s rank and file?

What are the differences between the characteristics of the
population and the insurgency? Do these differences matter?

What are the primary characteristics
(political/social/economic/religious) of the government leadership?

What are the differences between the characteristics of the
population and the government? Do these differences matter?

3. Catalyst
Notwithstanding genuine grievances among a population, some
sort of catalytic agent is usually necessary to mobilize and translate
unhappiness into insurgency. Defeating the insurgent hinges in good
measure on understanding the aims of the leadership, and devising a
means for separating that leadership from its rank and file and from the
larger population.

Has the insurgency articulated a desired end-state (e.g.,
overthrow and replacement of the existing government,
establishing a new state from a portion of the existing state’s
territory, limited self-rule, control of natural resources, or other
lesser changes)? If not, can an implicit desired end-state be
derived? What is the insurgency’s desired end-state? In short, does
the insurgency have a well-developed alternative to the
government that it is able to articulate?
69

WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS


What political/social/economic/religious objectives has the
insurgency articulated? How closely are these objectives connected
to the grievances of the population?

Are there other unarticulated but implicit objectives for the
insurgency that can be derived? How closely are these objectives
connected to the grievances of the population?
4. Organization
Organization matters. Although state-based militaries tend to
exhibit very similar organizational forms, insurgencies may take very
different organizational forms (highly centralized or cellular or highly
decentralized) and the organization of any given insurgency may change
significantly over the duration of a counterinsurgency campaign (e.g., an
insurgency is likely to improve and consolidate its organizational
arrangements the longer it is in existence). Courses of action appropriate
against centrally controlled insurgencies may have little effect on those
only loosely organized. Compound or complex insurgencies may become
more common and, while more difficult to comprehend, may also present
more seams for practical exploitation. Similarly, as both history (Peru) and
recent experience (Iraq) demonstrate, insurgencies in a given place and
time may very well not be unitary entities; they may be more aptly
described as compound or complex insurgencies.

Is there more than one insurgency? If so, do they co-exist in
the same space, or do they operate in different areas (as in western
and southern Sudan)? Are they coordinated, or do they compete
with each other for support of the population? Are there seams that
can be exploited?

How long has the insurgency been underway (e.g., is it in
an early, organizing phase or is it in a more mature phase with a
well-developed infrastructure)? See also Section 8, History, below.
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How is the insurgency organized (e.g., centralized or
decentralized)? Does it follow an identifiable philosophy (e.g.,
Maoist)? What is the content of that philosophy? What are the
strengths of the insurgent organization? Are the insurgency’s
political/leadership elements distinct from its coercive elements
(e.g., Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army)? Are there seams
between the political and coercive elements that can be exploited?

Does the insurgency control any territory? If so, what are
its dimensions and boundaries? Does that territory include
resources vital to the government (e.g., the Panguna copper mine
on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea)?
5. Support
State-based militaries do not typically live off the land; they bring
their own stuff with them. Nor during conventional combat operations do
they worry much about the legitimacy of their actions among a given
population. The contrary obtains on both counts during problems of
insurgency. Counterinsurgency campaigns must grasp the type, strength,
and distribution of support for insurgency in order to develop effective
courses of action.

To what extent does the insurgency depend upon local
popular support? What type of support does the population
provide (e.g., food, shelter, intelligence, cadre)?

Is there an identifiable ethnic, religious, racial or other
component to the insurgency (e.g., ethnic Chinese in 1950s British
Malaya)? Is the support of such identifiable components critical to
the insurgency? Are there exploitable seams?

Is support freely provided or is it coerced? Is domestic
popular support vulnerable to interdiction?

How do geography and demographics affect the
distribution of support (e.g., does support vary significantly
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between city and countryside)? Do ethnic differences fall out with
geography (e.g., Muslims in Thailand’s four southernmost
provinces vs. overwhelmingly Buddhist population in the rest of
the country)? Do some regions offer more support and others less?
Do these differences constitute vulnerabilities that can be
exploited?

Has the insurgency moved from the countryside,
unpopulated areas, or safe havens to an urban environment? If the
insurgents are able to hide within the general population, what
does that suggest about the movement’s popularity, or about the
government’s control over the population?

Does the insurgency enjoy external support? What is the
nature of that support (finances, arms, cadres, expert advice,
political, etc.)? What are the sources of that support (related
insurgencies in other states, other states, religious institutions, e.g.,
the Roman Catholic church and liberation theology in Latin
America)? Is outside support critical to the maintenance or success
of the insurgency (PRC support through Yemen to 1970s
insurgents in Dhofar, Oman)? Is that support susceptible of
interdiction?

In sum, is the insurgency’s support primarily internal or
external?
6. Force and Coercion
The coercive tactics employed and the level of coercion exercised
varies by insurgency. Accurately understanding the coercive strategy
increases the probability that it can be defeated and (remembering that
insurgent violence is theater) that the counterinsurgent agent will find a
way to exploit that strategy to separate the insurgent from the focal
population.
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What is the insurgency’s coercive strategy? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of that strategy?

What types of force/coercion does the insurgency employ
(conventional operations, guerrilla warfare, raids, assassinations,
terrorism, etc.)?

How well-armed (types and numbers) is the insurgency?

What is the net effect to date of the force/coercion used by
the government forces?
7. Legitimacy
The empirical record shows that insurgencies do not require
positive support from their focal population, but that suppressing active
opposition from that population may be sufficient for their purposes.
Nonetheless, over the long run, the insurgent will need to build legitimacy
for its program among that population even as it seeks to delegitimize the
government or occupying authority. Effectively countering the insurgency
therefore requires close attention to problems of legitimacy, particularly
with respect to the development of integrated information operations in
support of counterinsurgent efforts.

What efforts has the insurgency made to establish and
maintain its legitimacy? How has the population responded to
these efforts? How has the international community responded to
those efforts?

What efforts, if any, has the insurgency made to
internationalize the conflict? How has the international community
responded to those efforts?

Generally, what is the information climate? Who is doing
what in this arena? What mechanisms are in play? Who is winning
the information campaign?
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8. History
Apart from the immediate origins of the specific grievances
motivating the focal population, and the insurgency’s near-term
development and evolution, every insurgency has a history that bears on
the counterinsurgent campaign.

How did the insurgency originate (e.g., a nationalist
movement against a colonial power; in the wake of conventional
combat operations between states; with the breakup of a state; as a
result of long-festering grievances of some portion of the
population of a given state; etc.)?

Is there a historical experience/legacy of previous
insurgencies in the area of operations/country/region? What are the
implications of that legacy? Is insurgency perceived by the focal
population to be an accepted mechanism to redress grievances?

Has the state ever had an effective, legitimate, central
government that provides internal security and services to the
population and controls its borders (e.g., neither Somalia nor
Afghanistan have ever had such a government)?
9. Other Questions
Inevitably, given the wide variation in the structure of
insurgencies, other questions will also be useful to address in any analysis.
We provide several such questions here that none of the categories above
appropriately subsume. Effective counterinsurgency will also hinge on
carefully and creatively developing other questions to be asked and
answered about any given insurgency.

Are there other legitimate political/social/religious
institutions (political parties, organized religion, labor unions,
women’s groups, environmental groups, etc.) that provide other
venues for mobilizing the population or articulation of grievances?
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Are these groups closer to the insurgency or to the government?
Can they be co-opted?

Has the insurgency formed alliances of convenience with
other illegitimate or illegal groups (warlords, urban gangs, drug
cartels, etc.)? What are the bases for these alliances (what goods or
services does each provide for the other, e.g., finances, physical
protection, base of operations, etc.)? Are there seams vulnerable to
exploitation?

What are the relevant spatial factors (i.e., geography,
topography, climate)? Is the state or other area of concern an
island, a peninsula, landlocked? Are its neighboring governments
friendly to it, or do they support the insurgency overtly or covertly
(e.g., Yemen and Oman or Iran and Iraq)? Can its borders be
sealed? Are there areas within the state that the insurgency can
exploit as havens or bases of operation (e.g., terrain relatively
inaccessible to the government such as rainforests or mountains or
densely populated urban terrain)? What is the character of that
terrain?

What other factors/variables/issues should be included in
this analysis?
We began by observing that operational-level planning and
execution of military operations comprises one type of problem-solving
behavior. Effective problem solving commences with developing a
practical understanding of the structure of the problem confronted.
Insurgencies, we contended, represent problems of organized complexity,
which are most likely to be initially encountered as ill-structured
problems. For such problems, which are not readily assigned to
predeveloped categories, discovering or imposing a structure on the
problem not only is the first step but is likely to constitute the
preponderance of effort in problem solving. It forms the foundation for the
75

WAGHELSTEIN: READING THE TEA LEAVES: PROTO-INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS

development of practical courses of action to solve or mitigate the
problem at hand.
Based on practical experience and analysis of historical
insurgencies, we developed and provided a set of questions that we believe
will assist materially in comprehending the structure of any given
insurgency. These questions address the characteristics of the key actors in
any insurgency and the interrelationships among them, and, implicitly,
provide a basis for developing courses of action intended to exploit the
seams, either by reinforcing those interrelationships or driving wedges
between the actors, while simultaneously working toward weakening the
insurgent actors and strengthening the counterinsurgent agents. We leave
for another discussion the specific practical issues associated with using
the CES/MDMP processes to develop and evaluate courses of action based
upon the analyses developed through these questions.
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Annex B: Memorandum of Phone Conversation with
General John Galvin (U.S. Army, Ret.)
20 December 2010
General Galvin accompanied the outgoing CinC, General Paul
Gorman, to what he described as a highly contentious meeting with
General Walter Lopez, Commander, Honduran Armed Forces, in April
1985, during which Gen. Lopez expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with
the status of military aid to the AOH. The current aid package of $100
million was tied up in congressional debate. Additionally, most assistance
that did get through went to the El Salvadorans or to the CIA’s Contra
training operation in Yamales, Honduras. Lopez felt that Honduras itself,
which was in real danger from the Nicaraguans and their Soviet-supplied
T-55 tanks, deserved more. Honduran concerns focused on external
threats, while the El Salvador war was an internal insurgency and the
CIA’s focus was on destabilizing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
In their conversation about the insurgency, General Galvin
remembered the AOH forces on the north coast region (San Pedro Sula to
La Ceiba) as weak. [Note: It was not surprising that these units so far
away from the main effort would be described as weak. This area was the
one where the insurgency would develop.]
The bolsones were a major problem in that they had become
sanctuaries for the guerrillas. [Note: Per OAS-brokered ceasefire
provisions, these border areas were forbidden to troops from both El
Salvador and Honduras. This made them ideal for guerrillas to set up
camps without interference.] SF deployments were a “two-fers” benefit, as
the Hondurans got U.S. support without having to pay for it via Security
Assistance and the United States. SF units improved readiness for war
plans. The same held for Reserves and National Guard road building,
airfields, and training at Palmerola.
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Regarding the embassy: Gen. Galvin called Ambassador
Negroponte first-rate. [Note: The ambassador departed the year Gen
Galvin arrived]. The General was less complimentary re U.S. embassy
intelligence entities. What was really “first-rate,” he said, was the Central
American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) operating in the
Pentagon. This all-source fusion operation had the best of the community,
who were all-stars in their own organizations and were therefore of real
assistance (“both protected and did not have to leave D.C.”) . They
produced “good quality stuff.”
Regarding the threat of insurgency, the CinC felt that Tegucigalpa
[USEMB] believed the Honduran Armed Forces had any internal threat
“under control.” The embassy, MilGp, TF-B, attaché, and station believed
“nothing was happening.”
“Any time you deal with an Embassy you are dealing with so many
‘pipelines’ such as USAID, the Agency, the Country Team, etc., and the
ambassador has a tough job.” The General believed the only way to fix
this problem was that all traffic “must have [the Ambassador’s] signature
on it”—in other words, “one god.” [Note: Dean Hinton, U.S. Ambassador
in El Salvador 1981–1983, enforced this rule with outstanding results.]
Gen. Galvin further noted that “jealousies in the Intelligence field
in embassies has weakened our position.”
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Annex C: Recollection
by Captain Joe Carrerra, 7th SFG
During a trip I made to Nicaragua back in May 2003 … I was
interviewing a former council man in the port city of Corinto along the
Pacific coast. During my discussion he mentioned that he was at one time
the equivalent of a “Batallion Commander” during the war in the mid1980s. He was giving his version of his war stories in Honduras and their
cross-border operations. After a few cold beers he reflected for a moment
on one of the biggest obstacles they encountered. He stated that an
important part of their mission was “consentizacion del pueblo” and the
hardest parts of his mission was to go in after “los hijos de’ puta
americanos” had provided the townspeople or villagers with medical
treatment while taking care of the sick babies and elders. I knew exactly
what he was referring to and I took this as a back-handed compliment.
They had little else to offer other than their ideology and at the end of the
day the Hondurans were not too very impressed. As he added, I guess the
“Catrachos” didn’t get their fill with words, as they still went to bed
hungry. Perhaps on one level the effectiveness of what we were doing in
Honduras could be measured on the social side by the Civic Action
Programs and the apparent success these projects had, in addition to the
other critical missions we were carrying out. This, coupled with the
obvious success of the military training of the Honduran Armed Forces,
served to keep—in concert with several other factors—an insurgency from
really taking hold in Honduras. As my council man friend summed it up,
“Los gringos no ganaron en Honduras sin tener que pegarnos un tiro”—
it had the same effect as if they had shot us, without actually having to fire
a bullet.
What he meant was the following: The impact of Civic Action
Programs were quite significant in that they actually did quite a lot to help
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win the hearts and minds of many of the Honduran campesinos that were
basically sitting on the proverbial ideological fence between a Marxist
ideology or something else that provided another option, even if it was
wrapped around the mantle of liberation theology. In the case of this
particular unit, liberation theology was not their strength. The truth being
told, absent having a priest or member of the clergy present it would have
been difficult for to make a strong case for liberation theology . This is
quite different from the Jesuits that were operating in the UCA [Central
American University] in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. In other words,
the Civic Action Programs were extremely effective and had a lasting
effect long after the Civic Action activity actually occurred.
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Annex D: Reflections on Contributing Factors
by Major General John Stewart, J-2 SOUTHCOM
7 January 2011
I arrived in SOUTHCOM in July of ’86. The previous J-2 had
departed before my arrival. At that time, the big issues were the
insurgency in El Salvador and secondarily the Sandinistas and support for
the Contras, though the later was limited by official U.S. policy. Why was
the elevation of the threat in Honduras so long in coming? I suspect there
were several factors that supported the move by SOUTHCOM: the
Gorman/Galvin meeting with the Honduran command in April 1985, the
increasing need by the U.S. of Honduran cooperation, and the
improvement of SOUTHCOM’s intelligence operations under General
Galvin. JTF Bravo had grown to include logistics, training, and
considerable intelligence collection capabilities. We did not want
Hondurans fighting their own insurgency nor their thinking the U.S. did
not take them seriously. Moreover, General Galvin promulgated a broad
policy in the Americas to improve relations with Latin American military
institutions. While the main hot spots were in Central America, he wanted
to improve relationships throughout the AOR. So when senior Latin
American military leaders presented him with issues, he responded with
dispatch. In the case of Honduras, he would have put a microscope on the
budding insurgency. … Was it the focus on [Panama leader Daniel]
Ortega that delayed SOUTHCOM’s response to the issue of the Honduras
insurgency on the north coast? I suspect it was. First, I am not sure that
General Gorman and his staff believed the insurgency to be anything more
that low level criminal or tribal activity. As you point out, the in-country
American intelligence folks were not reporting a serious insurgency.
Furthermore, during the period ’83–’85, the U.S. Congress was debating
our policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, and one of the results was
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the Bollin Amendment, which proscribed U.S. support for the Contras.
Additionally, Congress also limited U.S. military presence in El Salvador
[the 55-man limit]. Thus, in light of the very serious nature of the threat in
Central America and to U.S. national security interests there as well as the
restriction placed on U.S. policy makers and promulgators, including
CINCSOUTH, SOUTHCOM had its hands full.
When I arrived at SOUTHCOM, General Galvin was very
dissatisfied with his intelligence organization and their entire operation.
To that end, I reviewed our entire J-2 operation and our relationships with
other intelligence organizations, both within SOUTHCOM and nationally.
We worked with defense and national agencies as well as the in-country
teams. We set up SOUTHCOM liaisons in our embassy in El Salvador and
at JTF Bravo. I visited the latter frequently and traveled to DC to establish
close relationships with appropriate intelligence organization in all of the
National Intel Agencies. We worked hand in glove with CIA reps in
Panama and SOUTHCOM and seconded a small military team under the
station chief in El Salvador.
As we reviewed the situation in the late summer and fall of 1986
for every area of importance to the CINC, we identified several major
gaps and misunderstanding. We then focused on filling in the intelligence
as completely as we could. Our work to reach out to the broader
intelligence community paid off. We treated others as team members, and
since we were closer to what was happening “on-the-ground,” they
respected our work and helped us to improve collection and reporting. I
believe that two key elements helped us come to describe that threat more
accurately: General Galvin’s direction to support Honduras as a key ally,
and his priority on improving every aspect on SOUTHCOM’s intelligence
operations and reporting.
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Annex E: Early Special Operations Force—What Came
Before
by Colonel Tom Kuster
The key intervention was begun under Gen Paul Gorman, who
initiated the “persistent presence” concept with a series of rolling exercises
in Honduras—the overarching AHAUS TARA series and other smaller
exercises of shorter duration. Though billed as efforts to enhance the
interoperability between U.S. and Honduran forces, they were unequivocal
efforts to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the Sandinistas and provide
tripwires for U.S. engagement if any Sandinista conventional retaliation
occurred against FDN safe havens in Honduras. [Note: These deployments
were designed not to focus on the potential insurgency but were in support
of the major War Plan. The advantages accrued from these deployments
were the repeated contact SF detachments made with Honduran units and
with the country as a whole.34]
The FOB 73 section in the attached is noteworthy. On the one
hand, the FOB was a participant in an overt combined exercise framework
to achieve interoperability and heightened proficiency with a key
Honduran battalion on a strategic LOC; on the other hand, it had distinct
missions emanating from SOUTHCOM, outside the context of the
exercise, that actually drove its mission profile and task organization. The
latter, however, were directly tasked by the CINC and unknown to the
exercise JTF Commander, an example of how Gorman truly understood
how to employ his Special Forces, strategically and operationally to
achieve multiple objectives. … [Note: These missions were discontinued
when Gen Gorman left the command]

34

From comments by Kevin M. Brew, Student, NWC
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I. 1983-84: Central America
The inauguration of President Reagan brought about a significant
shift in U.S. foreign policy—things were going to get significantly more
proactive as national security attention turned increasingly to those arenas
where the Soviet Union and its allies were challenging U.S. interests
indirectly, fostering instability through insurgency and terrorism. The
Sandinistas had recently toppled the regime of Somoza in Nicaragua,
installing a virtual Cuban satellite on the mainland. For the 7th SFGA, that
meant that Latin America and the Caribbean were back on the radar.
The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, besides having the largest and
best-equipped military force in Central America (supported from Cuba
and the Soviet Union), was fostering the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba, of course, had ramped up
its efforts to gain influence within the hemisphere and its hands were all
over the situations in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia, to name the
most obvious. The Mariel boatlift in October 1980 had soured U.S.-Cuban
relations even further. All of these confronted the Reagan Administration
as it took the controls of the ship of state.
In 1983, General Paul F. Gorman assumed command of the U.S.
Southern Command in Panama. Gorman had recently been the J5 of the
Joint Staff in Washington. He knew the “big picture” of national security
and military strategic objectives from the Washington perspective;
moreover, he knew how to influence the Pentagon and Services to support
him. His Executive Assistant on the Joint Staff, Colonel Stuart Perkins,35
assumed command of the 7th SFGA almost simultaneously. That personal
relationship between the Theater Commander and “his” supporting Special
Forces Group Commander would prove invaluable, on the one hand, while
35

Perkins had a long history of Special Forces assignments, both enlisted and as
an officer, including MACVSOG, 8th Special Forces Group in Panama, 10th
Special Forces Group and Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE) in
Europe. He was a Spanish and German linguist.
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on the other, it caused all kinds of consternation for others on Smoke
Bomb Hill and within the Army. The Group now had insights as to what
exactly the CINC envisioned and what his expectations were for the
Group to aid him in achieving his objectives. It also gave the CINC greater
insights into what the obstacles were that were being faced by the Group,
particularly those beyond the Group Commander’s sphere of control in
which the CINC’s influence needed to be brought to bear to remedy them,
i.e., manning, equipment, parts resupply priorities, funding for increased
language training, etc.
Gorman recognized that a single SF battalion (3rd Bn, 7th SFGA),
as allocated to SOUTHCOM in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan’s
Force Apportionment Annex, was not going to be able to provide
SOUTHCOM the capacity that would be needed to take a more proactive
posture throughout the region. The strategic intent would be to engage in a
full-blown, low-intensity conflict across the theater (not simply a localized
effort to buttress the government in El Salvador, albeit efforts there would
also intensify). Foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency were to be
the priority missions. Persistent presence, particularly in Central America,
was going to be the routine, not simply a one-time, short-lived surge.
Gorman intended to challenge any Sandinista or Cuban illusion of a lack
of resolve on the part of the U.S.
The 7th Special Forces Group, as a result of the contraction of
Special Forces units in the mid-1970s, found itself apportioned to three
distinct Regional CINCs—all, obviously, with widely disparate mission
requirements: (1) Pacific Command, with responsibility for all of Asia and
the Pacific; (2) Southern Command, with responsibility for all of Latin
America (less Mexico); and (3) Atlantic Command, principally for its
Caribbean responsibilities. The threats ranged from potential conventional
conflict on the Korean peninsula, contingency follow-on actions in
Southeast Asia, communist-inspired insurgencies in Central and South
America, instability in the Caribbean to include any contingencies
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regarding Cuba, even including defense of Alaska in the event of conflict
with the former Soviet Union. The breadth of the 7th Group’s Mission
Essential Task Lists and requisite language, area, and cultural orientation
was staggering.
The efforts began immediately to reprioritize and reorganize the
focus of the entire Group. Area orientation and theater alignment were
shifted to apportion the entire Group to the CINC in SOUTHCOM, with
LANTCOM relegated to a secondary priority and the Asia/Pacific
responsibilities shifted to the 12th SFGA (USAR). Planning for
involvement in the Korea exercise FOAL EAGLE was terminated.36 7th
SFGA’s long association with Asia/Pacific was now over. Latin America
and the Caribbean were to be the sole focus, Job #1.
The area and language reorientation (away from Asia/Pacific focus
to a Latin American focus) brought an immediate need to stock the Group
with as many Spanish linguists, hopefully with regional experience, as
possible and to do it fast. For some inexplicable reason, language
orientation had not been an overriding factor in how the personnel
management system determined where individuals were assigned. Guys
who had been assigned to 3/7 SFGA in Panama (the majority of whom
were Spanish linguists) were being parceled out to other units on Smoke
Bomb Hill when they rotated back to the States; some had even been
assigned to the European-focused 10th Special Forces Group at Fort
Devens, Massachusetts. Some assignments made sense; guys with special
skill sets being assigned as key instructors in the SF Schools system or if
they held a senior grade (e.g., Sergeant Major) that had lower vacancies
than the more junior enlisted grades. Some were amazingly nonsensical;
one case was an African-American Weapons Sergeant (E-7, Sergeant First
36

7th SFGA provided a small liaison element, under the control of the Group
DCO, to facilitate the transition of the 12th SFGA into a primary role in FOAL
EAGLE and continue with the 12th during the exercise (November 1983). After
that the 7th SFGA essentially disengaged from involvement with USPACOM.
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Class), fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese, who had been assigned
from 3/7 SFGA to a SFOD-A in the 10th SFGA with an area orientation to
Poland—not much chance that he’d survive behind Soviet lines in Poland
trying to blend into the local population! BG Joe Lutz, then Commander
of the USA JFK Center, perhaps recognizing that pressure was surely
coming from Gorman or others, changed the rules, giving the Group carte
blanche to screen all the other units for Spanish linguists so they could be
identified for consideration for reassignment to the 7th SFGA. This was
the first infusion and, as they came in, others with Pacific orientations who
may even have had long linkages with the 7th SFGA were moved out to
make room … a painful but necessary step.37 New officers and NCOs who
were coming out of the SF Qualification Course, and were destined for
assignment to 7th SFGA, were cycled through Spanish language training
(at Fort Bragg) before joining the Group. Those who failed to achieve
basic proficiency (at the lowest level, i.e., 1-1) were diverted to other
assignments whenever possible. Funding was identified to increase local
Spanish language training at Fort Bragg facilities, to include the Army
Education Centers. The command mantra was simple: “If you can’t speak
Spanish, you won’t deploy. If you’re non-deployable, we need to replace
you.” There was a swell of resistance, especially from those who feared
being on the outside, looking in. The undertone was that the “Panama
Mafia” was taking over the Group … and casting all others aside. The
actual truth, however, was that mantra was right on target—we couldn’t
afford to carry anyone who wasn’t going to contribute to the mission. If
you weren’t a linguist, able to operate with indigenous folks downrange,
than you better have some unique skill that we really needed to justify
your retention within the Group while you developed some degree of
language proficiency. The intent from the SOUTHCOM Commander was
37

Many of the old Asia-Pacific hands who were moved out of the 7th SFGA
were designated to form the core of the 1st SFGA Headquarters and the 1st SF
battalion (Okinawa) that were in the very early stages of re-activation.
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clear—he intended to employ the Group extensively within Honduras (and
wherever else needed) to create persistent presence to counterbalance
Cuban-Nicaraguan efforts to destabilize the area.
As this was occurring, significant command and control
arrangements were also placed into effect. At that time (spring 1983), the
SOUTHCOM special operations staff (J3 Special Operations Division)
was a small staff component; Theater Special Operations Commands
(TSOCs) had not been established and wouldn’t be for several years. It
was clear that funneling the relationship of the Group to the wider
SOUTHCOM staff and CINC through that small J3-SOD component was
not going to be either effective or efficient. The Group’s relationship
would become more of one like any other major component of the joint
force, with a direct relationship to the J3 and Theater Operations Center
for reporting, e.g., operations reporting, quarterly training briefings,
readiness reporting, etc., and the Commander receiving command
guidance and intent from the CINC (often directly). Neither the Army
Component Commander (193d Infantry Brigade Panama) nor the
Commander of the soon-to-be activated 1st US Army Special Operations
Command (Provisional)38 were in the operational chain of command for
the conduct of activities directed by the SOUTHCOM CINC through his
staff. The Group HQs at Fort Bragg converted from a peacetime construct
to that of a Special Forces Operational Base as called for doctrinally, with
an Operations Center and Support Center to manage all activities. The
second floor of the Group HQ’s building on Ardennes was secured with
38

As a result of a year-long Special Forces Mission Area Analysis that had been
pushed by Army Chief of Staff GEN Shy Meyers, the Commander JFK Center
(MG Joe Lutz) had been directed to reorganize and establish the 1st SOCOM
(Provisional) in 1983. Meyer was well aware of growing pressure in the
Congress for a major consolidation of all Special Operations Forces within a new
functional Combatant Command and proactively postured Army Special Forces
for the change he saw as inevitable. In 1986, Congress mandated the
establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command.
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access control, RATT rig communications were established 24/7 with
forward deployed elements, Area Specialist Teams were staffed within the
Operations Center to support deployed elements within an AST’s assigned
Area of Responsibility, Red Switch communications were emplaced to
allow the CINC direct communications connectivity with the Commander
and the Theater TOC with the SFOB Operations Center. Even small things
began to change; rather than referring to “companies,” the lexicon shifted
to terms like B detachments, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Area
Command Bases (ACBs), etc. While the administrative and sustainment
relationship for the Group and the CONUS-based battalions remained
through the 1st SOCOM (Provisional), the operational chain of command
shifted to a direct support (DS) relationship between the Theater
Command and the Group. Initially, the rank-imbalanced power struggle
over who would ultimately control the operational employment of the 3rd
SF Battalion in Panama played out between the Group Commander (a
colonel) and the Commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (a major
general), but in the end the SOUTHCOM CINC made it clear that all
Special Forces assets would be managed and employed through the Group
and its SFOB.39
The Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional de
Entrenamiento Militar, or CREM), on the northern coast of Honduras,
serves as a case in point to demonstrate how quickly things did indeed
change.
By 1982, it was clear that the Salvadoran Army needed a system
that would enable refit, reconstitution, and retraining of its forces to
39

Ironically, the Army Component Commander in SOUTHCOM (MG Fred
Woerner) would later become the CINC SOUTHCOM, but by that time, not only
had the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act been placed into effect
but his view from the Joint perspective outweighed his previous parochial
Service view. Additionally, SOUTHCOM by that time had a Theater Special
Operations Command (SOCSOUTH) to command and control theater special
operations.
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succeed in what was becoming a protracted counterinsurgency campaign
against the FMLN. The existing facility in eastern El Salvador, the Centro
de Entrenamiento Militar de las Fuerzas Armadas (CEMFA), handling
basic and advanced individual training40 and turning conscripts into
soldiers, couldn’t handle the expected demand, nor was the operational
environment conducive to the objectives of focused collective training.
Moreover, once the U.S. Congress put a ceiling on the number of U.S.
military advisors in El Salvador at 55,41 conduct of this mission inside El
Salvador was essentially out of the question. The first choice for a training
site outside the continental U.S. was at the U.S. Army School of the
Americas, collocated at Fort Gulick, Panama with the 3rd SF Battalion 7th
SFGA, but the Panamanian government denied the request to bring the
Salvadoran units into Panama. Seeking an alternative that would neither
stir any repercussions within the U.S. Congress nor incite internal
opposition42 within the host country, the decision to use Puerto Castilla,43
40

There was a continuous presence of Special Forces trainers at the CEMFA to
guide the effort; formed as a Mobile Training Team, under the supervision of the
USMILGP in San Salvador, the mission was primarily resourced from the 3d SF
Bn 7th SFGA from Panama.
41
There has always been a debate as to the genesis of the magic number “55” as
the cap on U.S. advisors. The tale that resonates the most is that when questioned
by the Congress as to how many advisory personnel he thought he would need
authorized, General Gorman responded, “55.” He had recently been briefed at
Fort Gulick, Panama by the Commander of the 3rd SF Battalion, who had
estimated that 55 SF personnel (as OPATTs, MTTs, etc.) would probably be
needed to enhance the ESAF operational capability (a planning figure). That
estimate did not include the multitude of non-SF requirements (logistics,
communications, medical, aviation maintenance, etc.) that would also be needed
to accomplish objectives outside the SF purview. In reaching for a number, he
recalled the brief, and responded “55”—a cap that often became difficult to live
within.
42
There were conflicts in the Honduran Congress and opposition from various
factions in Honduran society that the introduction of Salvadoran soldiers on
Honduran soil was a violation of Honduras’ declared neutrality. On 20 June
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Honduras as the site for CREM was finalized in May 1982 when
Honduras signed an amendment to a 1954 military collaboration
agreement with the U.S.
The mission of establishing the training facility and actually
conducting the training was a security assistance activity—funded via
military aid packages, approved by the U.S. Congress, for El Salvador
(and to a lesser degree, Honduras). Previously, security assistance projects
(MTTs, TATs, etc.) had been managed on Smoke Bomb Hill by an office
known as the Security Assistance and Training Management Office
(SATMO) under the direction of the Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for
Military Assistance. This endeavor was too big, too complex, and had too
much at stake to have what was essentially an administrative staff element
in charge. In the eyes of the CINC, the mission was one for the 7th SFGA.
Though any and all requirements that may be called for to remain
consistent with security assistance parameters would be observed, the
command and control of the mission would be executed through normal
operational command and control of Theater CINC (through the Theater
TOC) to the Group Commander (through the SFOB Operations Center) to
the U.S. Mission Commander (at the CREM).
The Commander C-71 (1st SF Battalion 7th SFGA) was given the
CREM mission, organizing a multidisciplinary task force of trainers,

1983, the National Congress held a closed-door session to vote on the existence
of the base. A compromise to quiet the opposition stated that the Salvadorans
would not be called soldiers but rather “students” and the U.S. military personnel
would not be called advisors, but rather “instructors.” Ironically, the personnel of
the 7th SFGA had already arrived in-country the week before with all their
equipment, and preparations were underway to begin the mission.
43
Although two locations (Puerto Castilla and Trujillo, the capital of Colon
department) were commonly referred to as the site of the CREM, it was actually
about 20 minutes away from Puerto Castilla near the small town of Silin on about
140 hectares. A legal battle over the actual ownership of the land persisted in the
Honduran courts for years.
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logisticians, and communications personnel, to deploy to Honduras for the
first increment of 179-day rotations that was to last through 1985 when the
CREM closed. This first element had to start from scratch: No existing
facility to begin with, no viable airfield to sustain and resupply the
mission, no training infrastructure (ranges, training areas, etc.) … they had
to start there before they could even begin accepting Salvadoran units for
training. Task Force C-71 had to deploy to Honduras by sea—arrival by
air wasn’t an option. The landing strip at Trujillo couldn’t accept the gross
cargo weight of USAF aircraft, and ground movement by road from the
major commercial airfields at San Pedro Sula or Tegucigalpa also wasn’t
possible. The coastal road network was primitive to say the best; they
were virtually impassable during the rainy season. Sustainment was by sea
until infrastructure could be developed.44
The mission was to convert units of the Salvadoran Army into
special counterinsurgency battalions called “hunter” battalions or
cazadores of about 350 men. Their mission was to complement the ESAF
Infantry Brigades assigned a regional presence mission by conducting
search and clear operations in areas occupied by the FMLN guerrillas,
which the Salvadoran government would follow-up with reconstruction
projects of social or economic development within a security framework
to be provided by the regional brigade.45 As a first step, however, the
44

Eventually the infrastructure around Trujillo and Puerto Castilla was
significantly improved to sustain the CREM’s operations. Existing docks were
extended; a new dock was added. Warehouses were built. A petroleum storage
facility was installed. The landing strip at Trujillo was extended. Roads to San
Pedro Sula and La Cieba were repaired and asphalted, finally linking Puerto
Castilla with Tegucigalpa. Other U.S. military units that came later for the
multiple combined exercises that followed benefited from these improvements,
as did the general economy of the area. When TF C-71 established its initial base
camp they were almost completely flooded out by the first rainy season—no one
anticipated just how bad the coastal flooding would actually be.
45
Following a concept that would return in later years in both Iraq and
Afghanistan to “clear, hold, secure, and sustain,” providing an environment in
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initial training was provided to a Honduran Army company that was
assigned a security mission for the CREM. The ESAF units were not
newly constituted; largely, they were battle-tested units that were
undergoing refit and reconstitution. Both individual and collective tasks,
culminating in battalion-level operations, were covered. Additionally,
lessons learned and information on noted deficiencies that were being
experienced by the U.S. Military Operational Planning and Training
Teams (OPATTs) assigned to the ESAF Infantry Brigades were passed
along to the training cadre at the CREM for incorporation into the
program(s) of instruction to systemically spread them throughout the
ESAF ground forces.
With efforts now underway to strengthen the operational capability
of the Salvadoran Army to confront and succeed under the
counterinsurgency combat conditions in their country, Gorman set his
sights on key supporting objectives. Several key factors had to be
addressed to meet the very real threat of Sandinista adventurism: the
capabilities and resolve of Honduras had to be bolstered, lines of
clandestine supply emanating from Nicaragua and Cuban had to be
curtailed, and the threat of Sandinista incursions into Honduran territory to
attack sanctuaries of the Nicaraguan opposition (commonly referred to as
the Contras) had to be countered by clear demonstrations of U.S. resolve
and genuine preparations to deal with such a contingency.
In February 1983, the United States and Honduras conducted a
joint-combined military exercise, AHAUS TARA (“BIG PINE”), at that
time the largest of its kind ever held in Honduras. It included roughly
1,500 U.S. military personnel46 and over 4,000 members of the Honduran
which the population could be secure from guerrilla action while the government
sought to implement programs to win their confidence and meet social needs.
46
Billed as an exercise to improve the interoperability of combined forces, it
included a wide variety of US military elements. US Army elements provided
mobility for Honduran forces and logistics and communications support. US
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Armed Forces, but the level of participation of Special Forces was
marginal. To continue U.S. engagement, SOUTHCOM immediately began
the planning of a follow-on exercise, AHAUS TARA II, to begin in August.
AHAUS TARA II was to be a considerably more extensive military
exercise, involving over 5,000 U.S. military personnel with a JTF HQs
(JTF-11) provided by Readiness Command (REDCOM) in Tampa to
provide command and control. This exercise, however, was to have a
much greater participation by Special Forces from the 7th SFGA. The
Group, however, would find itself operating off two distinct task menus—
one generated by the exercise planners and command element from
REDCOM and another with much more significant real-world
implications provided through the CINC and J3 of SOUTHCOM but not
shared with the REDCOM JTF and its exercise planners and staff.
In the general exercise plan, 7th SFGA was called upon to plan and
conduct a series of small-unit counterinsurgency exercises with the 11th
Infantry Battalion of the Honduran Army, essentially to build upon the
skills that they had received from an MTT from 3rd SF Bn 7th SFGA
during the previous AHAUS TARA I. The 11th Infantry Battalion’s
cantonment area (cuartel) was strategically located in southern Honduras
astride the Pan American Highway. The wider operational mission for the
Group that was not addressed in the exercise plan, however, had many
more moving parts.
True, there was a mission to conduct small-unit exercises,
eventually culminating in battalion-level operations and planning, but
there were other objectives beyond merely enhancing the proficiency of
the unit in its individual and collective tasks. The exercises were to expand
the operational presence of the battalion throughout its assigned sector
away from the “close to the cuartel” modus operandi that had existed up
Navy elements included two landing ships and landing craft for amphibious
movement. USAF coordinated and supported air supply and sustainment
operations as well as airfield and air traffic control.
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to that time, while achieving a degree of interoperability with U.S. forces.
These would be the same objectives for most of the other U.S. military
units that would be participating in the AHUAS TARA II exercise,
regardless of their Service or function.
However, beyond the awareness of the other exercise participants
and the JTF cadre, the Group had additional tasks with more real-world
connotations—tasks that significantly changed the SF component’s profile
from a simple exercise unit to something else. To understand these
missions and their role in the overall strategic intent of the CINC, one has
to appreciate not only the political-military environment of the situation
but also the geographic importance of where the 7th SFGA’s activities
were to occur.
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Radar Site

ESAF Naval

FOB 73

Figure 1: Gulf of Fonseca
The Gulf of Fonseca was a strategic LOC for Sandinista resupply
of the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador. It provided direct maritime
access for small craft, fishing vessels, etc., from Nicaraguan ports,
particularly Potosi, to the southern coast of El Salvador to include access
to the Lempa River. The Pan American Highway transited from Nicaragua
along the Honduran coast into El Salvador, providing another key LOC for
smuggling of weapons, munitions, and key equipment. In the lexicon of
any military planner, the area was key terrain for the adversary. From
another perspective, it was also key terrain to support the introduction of
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U.S. force and sustainment into southern Honduras if a Sandinista
invasion were to occur. The only viable docking area along the southern
coast was near San Lorenzo, a short distance from the 11th Infantry
Battalion’s cuartel. To the western side of San Lorenzo was a rudimentary
landing strip that, if enhanced, could be used as an air LOC. Tiger Island,
a short distance off the coastline, provided excellent sight lines for radar to
track maritime and air movement across the Gulf. The reasons why
Gorman wanted 7th SFGA smack dab in the middle were blatantly
obvious to the Group planners but largely escaped the understanding of
many in the JTF, who were firmly entrenched in an “exercise” mentality.
The mission analysis at the Group level led to the development of a
set of core missions that would drive all subsequent planning, particularly
the task organization, i.e., its versatility, its robustness, and its
preparedness to rapidly shift from an exercise paradigm to combat
operations:
 Through persistent presence, deter and disrupt smuggling of
weapons and supplies from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas
via the Pan American Highway LOC
 Expand proficiency and operational reach of the Honduran units(s)
in order to be prepared to oppose/obstruct a Sandinista incursion
across their border in the sectors paralleling the Pan American
Highway; be prepared to counter a Sandinista incursion (to include
anti-armor) along the Pan American Highway by force
 Conduct active force protection and situational awareness
 Maintain a mobile Quick Reaction Force capable of reinforcing
Tiger Island and other contingencies as directed by SOUTHCOM
The mission clearly called for a Forward Operating Base (FOB)
capable of conducting independent operations, with minimal reliance on
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support from other U.S. forces that may be in-country. FOB 7347 was
tasked organized much like the Special Action Force concept originated
by the 8th SFGA in the 1960s. The FOB C2 element was based on the
larger SFOD-B model of the 70s with a full staff, S1 through S-5. Six
SFOD-As were assigned.48 The Group’s Aviation Platoon was attached,49
along with a PsyOps/Civil Affairs team to handle civil-military operations
and civic action.50 Additional engineer capacity was considered, primarily
to assist in the construction of defensive positions (and to support civic
action projects), but the idea was jettisoned when SOUTHCOM planners
decided to collocate an Army Engineer Battalion with the FOB to improve
both the docking piers and the austere landing strip to support
contingencies requiring rapid reinforcement. The engineers were to be
assigned an additional mission to support construction needs of the FOB.
The “73” designation was based on the fact that the then 3/7 SFGA Executive
Officer (i.e., C-73) MAJ Phil Kensinger was to be FOB Commander. A fluent
Spanish speaker was deemed essential to lead the mission, given the anticipated
need to interact routinely with not only the Honduran 11th Battalion Commander,
but others throughout the Honduran General Staff. LTG Kensinger would later
culminate his career as the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command.
48
One of the SFOD-As was detached from the FOB location at San Lorenzo and
positioned on Tiger Island to lead the security efforts that protected the radar and
communications facilities on top of the mountain and the OGA maritime
activities at the base.
49
The UH-1Hs operated from the FOB location; the 101st Air Assault Aviation
Battalion based in Palmerola provided lift support to all other U.S. forces. To
ensure the operational readiness of the FOB’s helos, the 7th SFGA SFOB
requested that SOUTHCOM direct a higher priority (FAD-1) for the FOB 73
Aviation Platoon for parts, supplies, fuels, lubricants, etc. A Forward Area Refuel
and Re-arming Point (FARRP) were established at the FOB and to their great
consternation the 101st Aviation Battalion was tasked to support any needs of the
FOB Aviation Platoon as a mission-essential priority.
50
Augmentation to the PsyOps/CA team was rolled in and out throughout the
deployment to support a wide variety of civic action activities, such as dental,
veterinary, well drilling, etc.
47
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SOT-As from the Group’s Military Intelligence Company, as well as
counterintelligence personnel, were also included in the FOB’s force
package. If that wasn’t enough, the package also required that a Secure
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) be established at the FOB;
without it, the SOT-As would have been marginalized and the FOB’s
connectivity to real-time sensitive intelligence from SOUTHCOM would
not have existed. SOUTHCOM validated the need and requested the full
support of the DIRNSA to make it happen, which it did. The only SCIF
operational within the U.S. forces engaged in AHUAS TARA II was at
FOB 73—something that should have been a signal to the planners in
REDCOM and JTF-11 that there was more involved in the FOB 73
mission than it appeared.
As an aside, a little-known aspect shows the attention to detail and
the level of preparations involved in the pre-deployment ramp-up for the
mission. A pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) to the Honduran 11th
Battalion discovered that the unit’s proclivity to avoid extended patrolling
was partially based on the fact that they had no means to resupply forward
elements in the difficult terrain throughout their sector. The survey team
itself had rented horses from local campesinos to do their off-road area
reconnaissance, but the Honduran military had never considered that
option. With these insights gleaned from the PDSS, the Group arranged
for some members of the deploying SFOD-As to attend a civilian muleskinning school in Pocatello, Idaho, where they learned the fundamentals
of load packing and horsemanship in order to provide advisory assistance
to the Hondurans on what was going to be for them a new method of
resupply.
FOB 73 deployed to Honduras in August 1983 with a full combat
load, plus all the training aids and equipment they’d need to conduct the
individual and collective training of the 11th Battalion. Additionally, they
brought in the materials (sandbags, concertina wire) that they would need
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to convert the sleepy Honduran cuartel into the virtual firebase it quickly
became.
With the CREM operating full bore on the north coast and FOB 73
in the south, the SFOB established a Forward Area Support Team (FAST)
in Tegucigalpa to facilitate reception, staging, and onward integration
(RSOI) of unit personnel and equipment moving through either the JTF 11
military airhead in Palmerola or the commercial facilities at Toncontin
Airport in Tegucigalpa and to coordinate any matters with the Honduran
General Staff that may be required. The FAST, led by a captain with
several experienced E7s/E8s, all fluent linguists, was attached to the
USMILGP but authorized direct liaison with key Embassy staff (e.g.,
Chief of Station, USAID Coordinator, etc.) to represent the Group’s
interests. This decision proved immeasurably productive, not only in
support of the CREM and FOBs,51 but also for the many other SF MTTs
and smaller-scale combined exercises that emerged in 1984, e.g., the Area
Command Base/SFOD-As in Mocoron, Jutigalpa, Tamara and Mercala.
While all this activity surrounding FOB 73’s missions was
underway, the Group couldn’t afford to forget about the crucial issue of
effectively sustaining the operational tempo. The troops at the CREM
were on a 179-day rotational cycle; we were gearing up the second
rotation back at Bragg to assume the mission from the first group. They
were undergoing an intensive pre-deployment training and review cycle.
Additionally, as soon as FOB 73 was out the gate and operational,
SOUTHCOM generated another major requirement for a presence and
training mission. The Group had fully anticipated that General Gorman
51

An additional FOB (FOB 72) was deployed to Palmerola in early 1984 to
command and control similar combined exercises (individual and collective
training) with Honduran battalions along the border areas of El
Salvador/Honduras and the El Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area.
Much like its counterpart (FOB 73), FOB 72 had a strategic mission beyond the
training mission.
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would want FOB 73 fully operational well beyond the life cycle of the
AHAUS TARA II exercise and was planning on doing so, requiring that the
troops there would have to rotate out no later than January 1984 in order to
stay within the restraints of Army deployment policy. Army regulations at
that time required that a soldier could not be deployed in a temporary duty
status overseas for more than 179 consecutive days, unless deployed in
declared hostilities. For all intents and purposes, we were at peace, not a
state of declared hostilities, so we decided that we needed to establish a
prudent rotation plan so that the guys could plan their lives with some
degree of assuredness. Regardless of the nobility of that goal and how
many times we revised the plan, we were constantly behind the eight-ball
for one simple reason: The requirements emanating from SOUTHCOM
kept expanding … sometimes small, sometimes large. There was no point,
however, where we reached a “stop that one, in order to do a new one”
stage; it was always “keep up what you’re doing and add this one.”
AHAUS TARA III would immediately follow the AHAUS TARA II
exercise and FOB 73 would roll along without skipping a beat.
Additionally, however, there was another requirement—one that would
require another FOB. This one would focus on combined exercises with
Honduran Army units assigned in the western portion of the country,
along the border areas of El Salvador/Honduras and the El
Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area. Much like its counterpart
FOB 73, FOB 72, as we would designate it, had a strategic mission
beyond the training mission. As Salvadoran military operations against the
FMLN improved, the guerrillas began to seek the sanctuary of the
contested border areas (bulsones) resulting from the 1969 Soccer War
between El Salvador and Honduras. These five areas were essentially “no
man’s lands” where neither the Salvadoran nor the Honduran military
would enter to exert influence because of the fear that each would perceive
such actions by the other as a violation of Organization of American States
negotiated cease-fire that ended the war and the eventual peace treaty that
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both nations signed in 1980. The peace treaty left the adjudication of the
status of the disputed border demarcation to the International Court of
Justice, but at that time in 1983–84, the Court had not addressed the matter
and it remained a sore point, particularly between the two militaries. With
no sovereign force within the bulsones, the FMLN guerrillas had a secure
safe haven—one where they could rest their forces, conduct training, stage
and store resupplies, care for and rehabilitate their wounded, etc. Not only
wouldn’t either the Honduran or Salvadoran military employ any ground
forces into those areas, they both also proscribed any indirect fire
(artillery, mortars) or aerial fire (from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft)
into those zones. The results were camps within the bulsones, fully evident
in overhead photography, operating with impunity and completely
unchallenged. The hope was that SF trainers with the Honduran Battalions
and the SF OPATTs with the Salvadoran brigades and cazadores could
influence the extant military animosity sufficiently so that the countries’
militaries would cooperate in operations against the FMLN sanctuaries,
under agreed-upon conditions … even if the U.S. SOF personnel had to
act as the facilitators of that coordination and cooperation.
Though the FOB 72 mission was not expected to launch until late
1983 or early 1984, planning began in earnest in September 1983. One
immediate wrinkle that was thrown into the mix by SOUTHCOM was an
additional requirement for FOB 72 to provide secure compartmented
intelligence support to the AHAUS TARA III Joint Task Force
Headquarters that would be set up at Palmerola Air Base in Comayagua,
Honduras. That wasn’t something that we’d expected. We surely
anticipated we’d deploy FOB 72 with a SCIF capability, similar and
compatible with that already cranking at FOB 73 so that it had
connectivity to national intelligence systems, particularly the National
Security Agency, but we envisioned basing FOB 72 near the town of
Santa Rosa de Copan near the tri-border area, not in Palmerola, which was
in a more centralized location within Honduras. To adjust we did as we
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were directed, placing components (to include the SCIF) of FOB 72 in
Palmerola but positioned a large chunk of the staff and all the actual
SFOD-As at the forward location near Santa Rosa de Copan, with the
SFOD-As dispersed to the Honduran units they’d be operating with. One
was designated FOB 72 (at Palmerola); the operational satellite was
designated FOB 72X (at Santa Rosa). Just like some sort of amoeba, once
FOB 72 launched the SF presence was all over the map of Honduras.
One of the interesting dilemmas that the Group encountered
throughout the Central America campaign was the difference in funding
streams that applied to the different activities. There were fundamentally
three distinct categories:
 The CREM was a security assistance activity, which placed it
under a distinct regulatory regime under the oversight of the
Army’s security assistance structure. The funding of supplies and
materials required certain accountability and billing procedures;
also, the Group’s personnel who participated in the mission at the
CREM were authorized a certain per diem since they were
essentially a “mobile training team” … albeit not very mobile.
 The Group’s personnel at the FOB locations (72, 72X, and 73),
however, were under “field conditions” participating in combined
exercises, so per diem wasn’t authorized. Any transfer of materials
to their partnered Honduran units had to be justified as occurring
only to ensure the attainment of the “U.S. training objectives.”
This issue precipitated a number of audits and investigations as to
whether such simple items as paper targets used by the Hondurans
during marksmanship exercises should have been billed to the
Honduran military rather than be provided from Group resources
as an essential element to the attainment of the Group’s training
objectives. The Group’s position was that the provision of key
consumables within the context of the combined exercises
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contributed to the maintenance of our Foreign Internal Defense
core tasks (individual and collective) such as area/language
immersion, training techniques, etc.; moreover, the overarching
objective of achieving a confident degree of interoperability with
Honduran forces in order to support the Group’s ability to support
combined operations that may be required by USSOUTHCOM in
defense of Honduras or U.S. forces in-country. The concept of
what became known as “Deployments for Training” (DFTs)
eventually emerged and became a more acceptable practice. In
later years (post-9/11), Congress granted specific authority to the
Commander U.S. Special Operations Command to fund such
activities with partner nations in support of the war on terror.
 The FAST in Tegucigalpa was TDY with full per diem allowances
to include lodging allowance.
To achieve some degree of equity between the three, the Group
also had to carefully manage the rotation of teams (and individuals)
between the venues since assignment to each locale was compensated
differently and the expectation was that the op tempo would not diminish
in the foreseeable future.
The implications to the overall Group budget were also profound,
factoring in significantly increased blade hours; repair parts and resupply
for the FOBs; increased TDY budgets for travels to theater for planning
and briefings, etc.; increased training costs for language training (or
refresher) for new personnel; and many other unforecasted requirements.
The “peacetime” forecasts in 1982 had in no way anticipated what would
occur in 1983 and 1984. This caused ripples within the overall 1st
SOCOM budget, requiring the diversion of funds from other 1st SOCOM
accounts to sustain the 7th SFGA operational requirements. The Group
Comptroller became more and more a key participant in the internal
operational planning process.
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